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Abstract A Higher-Order Logical approach to ontology evo-
lution is applied to examples in Physics. Based on this ap-
proach, a framework is proposed which includes a method-
ology for the formalization of ontology evolution in Higher-
Order Logic and an implementation of this methodology
in the theorem prover Isabelle. The proposed basic mecha-
nisms for evolution are called Ontology Repair Plans. These
operate on ontologies formalised as contexts, i.e., as multi-
ple logical theories. In such a setting, ontologies may con-
tradict one another or introduce redundancies with respect to
one another, without any of them containing logical contra-
dictions or redundancies. When, though, an inconsistency or
a redundancy between two or more ontologies becomes ex-
plicit, it may be resolved by the application of an Ontology
Repair Plan, as each plan compiles together a pattern for di-
agnosis and transformation rules for effecting a repair. The
repair can combine the retraction and/or addition of axioms
as well as the deeper modification of the language in which
the ontology is represented.
Keywords Higher Order Logic, Ontology Evolution,
Physics.
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1 Introduction
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and, more generally, Computer
Science (CS) are presently faced with the challenge of how
autonomous software can manipulate its own knowledge.
Such knowledge is typically represented in an ontology that
conceptualises the entities of the software’s application do-
main and allows the software to reason about such entities
at a higher level of abstraction than simply the level of data
or information. Just like any abstract model, ontologies are
limited representations of the world, which is dynamic and
inherently complex. If autonomous systems are to feature
any kind of robustness with respect to the dynamics and
complexity of changing environments and goals, of commu-
nication acts and of new information, they must be able to
autonomously update their own ontologies.
The literature on the subject of updating an ontology
in the face of new information often uses the phrase ontol-
ogy evolution and usually concentrates on how Description
Logic (DL) axiomatic theories for Semantic Web applica-
tions or First Order Logic (FOL) theories need to retract ax-
ioms or modify entailments in order to maintain their coher-
ence and consistency. Section 2 discusses how this type of
work on ontology evolution is related to ours.
Based on this discussion, we present our approach to
ontology evolution in Higher-Order Logic (HOL). This ap-
proach underlies a framework called GALILEO, for Guided
Analysis of Logical Inconsistencies Leads to Evolved On-
tologies. There are a few previous publications on GALILEO,
e.g. (Bundy and Chan, 2008; Chan and Bundy, 2008; Chan
et al., 2010). Here we go beyond those papers by firmly po-
sitioning our proposal with respect to the wider literature
on ontology evolution and by presenting a stable integra-
tion, standardization, implementation and evaluation of the
framework 1.
GALILEO includes a methodology for the formalization
of ontology evolution in higher-order Logic (HOL), as well
as an implementation of this methodology in the automated
theorem prover Isabelle. As discussed in more detail below,
in GALILEO the term “ontology” is interpreted in an inclu-
sive way, to encompass any representation of knowledge,
usually as a logical theory. We have chosen a logic that is
rich enough to represent, in a natural way, the object-level
concepts and relationships of Physics as well as the meta-
level concepts and relationships of ontology evolution pro-
cesses. This argues for a logic such as HOL, which is poly-
morphic2, typed, and higher-order.
1 Further workshop reports and the implementation of GALILEO
can be downloaded from http://dream.inf.ed.ac.uk/projects/
ontology_evolution/
2 Polymorphic means that some terms of the language can have more
than one type.
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In GALILEO, the basic evolution-mechanisms are called
Ontology Repair Plans (ORPs). Each ORP compiles together
a pattern for diagnosis of conflicts between ontologies and
transformation rules for effecting a repair. For both devel-
opment and testing, we rely on examples from Physics, as
advances in this field may naturally be modelled as cases of
ontology evolution and they are usually well documented.
Physicists revise predictive theories when confronted with
conflicting experimental evidence. Therefore, the ORPs typ-
ically assume there is one ontology representing a predictive
theory and other ontologies representing an experimental or
observational set-up for that theory. When the experimental
ontology contains a theorem that contradicts or is redundant
with respect to a theorem of the theoretical ontology, an ORP
is triggered and amends the two ontologies so that the con-
flict is resolved. The development methodology of GALILEO
revolves around the selection of initial ontologies by the col-
lection, analysis, formalisation, implementation and testing
of appropriate case studies in the history of Physics and of
the ORPs inspired by them.
The initial ontologies are formalized and implemented
as contexts, i.e., as multiple logical theories, which are iso-
lated from other theories and which may even use their own
local language to describe the entities in the domain. In such
a setting, if the ontologies share the same language, they
may explicitly contradict one another or introduce redundan-
cies with respect to one another, without any of them con-
taining logical contradictions or redundancies. On the other
hand, if the ontologies do not share the same language they
may implicitly contradict one another or introduce redun-
dancies with respect to one another without producing an
explicit logical contradiction or a redundancy at the global
level. When, though, two or more such ontologies are bridged,
i.e., mapped or aligned through a third one which aligns
them and resolves their differences, they will be able to share
axioms. This will allow the proof of contradictory facts or
make some facts redundant, thus affecting the robustness of
the system. In both these types of situation (i.e., shared or
non shared language) we say that the ontologies are locally
consistent or parsimonious but globally inconsistent or re-
dundant. When the global inconsistency or redundancy be-
comes explicit the application of an ORP may resolve the
conflict between the two ontologies.
Shortly, we investigate in Higher-Order Logic the prob-
lem of ontology evolution from the perspective of automat-
ing the mechanisms to repair locally consistent or parsimo-
nious but globally inconsistent or redundant ontologies.
The empirical part of our methodology supports the long-
term objectives of the definition of a theory of ontology evo-
lution, as well as of an evolution calculus. In this article we
test the following hypothesis:
Automated ontology evolution via ORPs is computa-
tionally feasible and can account for the kinds of on-
tology evolution that are observed in human problem
solving in the Physics domain. We show that desir-
able properties, e.g., coverage, efficiency, maintain-
ability, high quality of the repairs, can be achieved.
The empirical results provided by the evolutions proposed
by GALILEO allow for the evaluation of all these desirable
properties. In particular, the results allow us to conclude that
the generality of a Higher-Order Logical approach to ontol-
ogy evolution is beneficial for the quality of the repairs, in
terms of the meaningfulness of the proposed evolutions.
Section 2 discusses related work and makes the case for
a higher order approach. Section 3 describes the adopted
methodology. Sections 4, 5, 6 present three ORPs and appli-
cations for each them. These three sections are quite dense
in formal content, they describe in detail the formal appara-
tus of our proposal as well as a number of models of case
studies to which our ORPs apply. Section 7 illustrates the
implementation of GALILEO. Section 8 discusses the eval-
uation. Section 9 discusses further work. Section 10 draws
some conclusions.
2 Discussion of related work
The literature on the subject of updating an ontology in the
face of new information often uses the phrase ontology evo-
lution and usually concentrates on how DL ontologies for
Semantic Web applications or FOL theories need to evolve,
either to maintain their own coherence and consistency (on-
tology debugging, in a broad sense) or to establish a relation-
ship with other ontologies (ontology alignment, in a broad
sense).
Debugging yields notions like incoherence and incon-
sistency diagnosis and repair (Haase et al., 2005; Kalyan-
pur et al., 2006b; Ji et al., 2009; Lam et al., 2008), belief
revision (Flouris, 2006), conservative extensions (Ghilardi
et al., 2006). There are also pragmatic approaches such as
(Lo¨sch et al., 2009) that, in analogy with database technol-
ogy, tackle the problem of updating an ontology by means of
domain-specific knowledge about temporal changes. Such
pragmatic solutions fall outside the scope of this discussion,
which concentrates on domain-independent and logic-based
methods for ontology evolution.
Ontology alignment, on the other hand, yields notions
like matching (Doan et al., 2004; Giunchiglia and Shvaiko,
2004), mapping, bridging, contextualisation (Bouquet et al.,
2004; Stuckenschmidt et al., 2004), distribution (Borgida
and Serafini, 2003; Stuckenschmidt, 2006; Homola, 2007).
Both debugging and alignment impact ontology evolu-
tion, but they are somewhat orthogonal to each other. Typi-
cally, approaches to alignment examine whether some situ-
ations yielded by aligning or integrating ontologies is prob-
lematic for some desirable properties of DL, and often a
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sig(Tuni) ::= {
Person,Student,Employee, . . .} (1)
Tuni ::= {
Student v Person, (2)
Employeev Person, (3)
Employeev ¬Student, (4)
PhDStudent v Student, (5)
PhDStudent v Employee} (6)
Auni ::= {
bruce : PhDStudent} (7)
Fig. 1: Incoherent and inconsistent DL ontology of members
of a university. Note the following DL conventions: Av B is
the DL notation for the first-order logic formula ∀x.A(x)→
B(x); i : A is the DL notation for i is an instance of A; a DL
ontology consists of a TBox, T , in which concepts are speci-
fied using the signature elements of sig(T ), and of an ABox,
A where assertions are made about the individuals using the
terminology; the axiomatic theory of members of a univer-
sity formed by the ordered couple (Tuni,Auni) is a knowledge
base. In DL terms (Flouris et al., 2006), (Tuni,Auni) is incon-
sistent, i.e., it has no models, because axioms (7, 5) allow to
conclude that bruce is a Student while axioms (7, 6, 4) allow
to conclude that bruce is not a Student. The source of the in-
consistency lies in Tuni, which is incoherent, i.e., it contains
the unsatisfiable concept PhDStudent. A concept is unsatis-
fiable if it is mapped to the empty set in all models of the
ontology.
modular approach is proposed to avoid those situations. As
opposed to this, the literature on ontology debugging, typ-
ically tries to pin down how to diagnose situations that are
already acknowledged as problematic (e.g. inconsistencies,
redundancies, etc.), or how to repair ontologies that suffer
such problems.
Although our proposal in this article contains elements
of alignment (as mentioned, ontologies are formalized as
HOL contexts), our main focus is on diagnosis and repair.
Therefore we do not delve into the literature on alignment,
but discuss relevant examples of the literature on debugging.
A standard example used in the DL literature about inco-
herence and inconsistency diagnosis and repair is shown in
Figure 1. In DL terms (Flouris et al., 2006), the axiomatic
theory of members of a university formed by the ordered
couple (Tuni,Auni) is inconsistent, i.e., it has no models, be-
cause it allows to conclude a contradictory fact, i.e., that
bruce is both a Student and not a Student. The inconsistency
is due to the incoherence of Tuni, in particular to the concept
PhDStudent which is unsatisfiable, because it is mapped to
the empty set in all models of the ontology.
In order to diagnose the unsatisfiable concept and re-
pair the incoherence and the inconsistency, DL approaches
such as (Haase et al., 2005) try to identify the axiom that,
if removed, would allow to re-establish coherence and con-
sistency. This is done by algorithms that compute so-called
Minimal Unsatisfiability-Preserving Subsets of the ontology
(MUPS). For instance, starting from a subset of the ontol-
ogy containing one axiom, the algorithm adds to the subset,
one at the time, the axioms that are connected to it, i.e., that
share type symbols with it (e.g., axioms (4, 5)), until the sub-
set is unsatisfiable. In Figure 1 the only MUPS of (Tuni,Auni)
contains axioms (4, 5, 6, 7). A judgement call is therefore re-
quired to decide which axiom to remove. This decision pro-
cedure may increase in complexity in scenarios in which it
is more than one group of axioms that independently make a
given concept unsatisfiable, thus multiplying the number of
MUPS.
Even in cases where only one MUPS is returned, the ax-
iomatic structure of the ontology may be entangled and make
axiom-removal simply infeasible. Consider for instance the
version of (Tuni,Auni) given below (where / is set subtrac-
tion) in which axioms (4, 5) are substituted by one single
axiom (8):
T ∗uni ::= Tuni/{Employeev Person,
Employeev ¬Student}
∪{Employeev Personu¬Student} (8)
Removing axiom (8) would affect the entailment structure
of T ∗uni beyond what is needed and make the repair harmful,
because an instance of Employee would no more qualify as
an instance of Person. This has motivated approaches such
as (Lam et al., 2008; Kalyanpur et al., 2006a; Schlobach
and Cornet, 2003) that try to refine both the diagnostic and
the repair operations, in order to allow for more surgical re-
movals or even axiom rewriting. In such approaches the di-
agnosis usually applies minimal unsatisfiability to abstract
versions of the axioms at hand. For instance, axiom (8) would
have to be broken up along its conjunction, i.e., reduced to
(4, 5), so that a separate unsatisfiability test can be run on
each conjunct. A problematic aspect of this approach to di-
agnosis is that different types of formulae and connectives
need different types of abstraction rules and, of course, the
complexity of the rules increases with the complexity of the
axioms. Abstraction may also become a problem when re-
pairing, because the user needs to be able to relate back the
abstracted axioms to the original ones in order to proceed to
their removal, and this is not always a straightforward task.
An additional type of incoherence and inconsistency di-
agnosis and repair is presented in (Ji et al., 2009). This ap-
plies a MUPS-based, axiom-removal approach to the case of
multiple aligned ontologies, so-called ontology networks,
in particular to the diagnosis and repair of networked on-
tologies that are locally consistent and globally inconsis-
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tent. Figure 2 shows an example of a coherent and consis-
tent version of (Tuni,Auni), (T ∗∗uni ,Auni), that is mapped onto
another coherent and consistent ontology (Tcom,Acom) for
company members. The network formed by these two on-
tologies through the mapping Map(T ∗∗uni ,Tcom) is incoherent
and inconsistent, as it allows to prove again that bruce both
is and is not a Student. Coherence and consistency are re-
established by repairing the mapping.
A non-DL-based approach to problems of ontology evo-
lution is implemented in the Ontology Repair System (ORS)
(McNeill and Bundy, 2007). ORS addresses the problem of
ontology alignment in a multi-agent planning environment:
a problem which it is essential to solve in order to realise the
vision of the Semantic Web. In the ORS environment some
agents offer services and others require these services. Each
agent represents these services with planning action rules
similar to those of the Stanford Research Institute Problem
Solver (STRIPS), i.e., with preconditions and effects writ-
ten in a first-order logical language, namely, in the Knowl-
edge Interchange Format (KIF). It is inevitable with any suf-
ficiently large agent community that there will be differ-
ences between their ontologies, even when there have been
attempts to standardize them. The purpose of ORS is to iden-
tify and repair these ontological mismatches at run time,
since compile-time alignment is unrealistic in this scenario.
Moreover, this has to be done without full access to the
other agents’ ontologies, since full access is also unrealistic.
ORS’s ontology repair differs from the more common ontol-
ogy matching in being aimed at identifying and correcting
errors in a single ontology rather than constructing a map-
ping between two ontologies. Ontology repair is also done
automatically, dynamically and without access to the ontolo-
gies of other agents, whereas typically ontology matching
has some manual element, is done statically and with full ac-
cess to both ontologies. The ORS ontology repair operations
consist mostly of syntactic manipulations of the underlying
logical representation, e.g., the number or order of the argu-
ments of a function may be changed; a function may be di-
vided into two or more, or two or more may be merged into
one. The only belief revision operations available to ORS
are to add or remove a precondition of an action rule. ORS
has been successfully evaluated by showing that it emulates
a high percentage of their owners’ manual modifications to
third party ontologies taken from the KIF and planning com-
munities.
In general, we think that the approaches described above,
particularly the DL-based ones, have proven insufficient to
address the study of the automation of ontology evolution,
because of a number of circumstances:
1. Most proposed approaches depend on users’ instructions,
which does not include ontology evolution performed at
runtime, for instance, by agents in heterogeneous envi-
ronments.
T ∗∗uni ::= Tuni/{Employeev ¬Student}
A∗∗uni ::= Auni
sig(Tcom) ::= {
Person,Trainee,Staff , . . .} (9)
Tcom ::= {
Traineev Person, (10)
Staff v Person, (11)
Staff v ¬Trainee} (12)
Map(T ∗∗uni ,Tcom) ::= {
〈1,Student,Trainee〉, (13)
〈2,Employee,Staff 〉} (14)
Fig. 2: Locally coherent and consistent and globally inco-
herent and inconsistent network of DL ontologies of mem-
bers of a university and of a company. Note the follow-
ing convention: 〈id, ti, t j〉 means that term ti is mapped onto
term t j. (T ∗∗uni ,A∗∗uni) is a coherent and consistent version of
(Tuni,Auni) and is mapped onto another coherent and con-
sistent ontology (Tcom,Acom) for company members. The
network formed by (T ∗∗uni ,A∗∗uni) and (Tcom,Acom) through
the mapping Map(T ∗∗uni ,Tcom) is incoherent and inconsistent,
as it allows to prove again that bruce both is and is not a
Student. Coherence and consistency are re-established by re-
moving lines (13) or (14) from the mapping.
2. Automated ontology repair systems, e.g., the Semantic
Web Ontology editor (SWOOP) (Kalyanpur et al., 2006b),
or even those that take heterogeneity into account like
the Repair and Diagnose Ontology Network (RADON)
(Ji et al., 2009), focus mostly on retracting axioms and
modifying entailments. Systems like (Lam et al., 2008)
that go beyond axiom retraction and that try to enable re-
fined repair operations seem to be doing so on a limited
logical basis and they still have to rely on users’ judge-
ments in order to evaluate the helpfulness and harmful-
ness of repairs. Furthermore, such systems do not sup-
port deeper syntactic manipulations, e.g., changes of the
signature of the language.
3. The focus on DL or FOL ontologies does not allow for a
sufficiently general analysis and resolution of ontolog-
ical faults. The limited expressivity of FOL, let alone
fragments of it such as DL, constitutes a limit on the
modelling of ontology evolution. Without the means to
quantify over and to reason about the predicates, it is vir-
tually impossible to formalise and automate sufficiently
generic ontology evolution patterns.
In order to deal with the first two limitations found in
the literature, we investigate the problem of ontology evo-
lution from the perspective of maximizing the potential for
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automation of syntactic operations more complex than ax-
iom retraction only. In particular, we focus on repair opera-
tions that can evolve the language of the ontology. To this
end we concentrate on the repair mechanisms for locally
consistent or parsimonious but globally inconsistent or re-
dundant ontologies. As mentioned in Section 1, we assume
that information about the same entities is distributed in a
system across different ontologies or contexts. If the con-
texts share the same language, they may explicitly contradict
one another or introduce redundancies with respect to one
another, without any of them containing logical contradic-
tions or redundancies. On the other hand, if the contexts do
not share the same language they may implicitly contradict
one another or introduce redundancies with respect to one
another without producing an explicit logical contradiction
or a redundancy at the global level. When two such con-
texts are bridged, i.e., mapped through a third one which
resolves their differences, they will be able to communicate
and prove facts in terms of each other. In both these types
of situation (i.e., shared or non shared language) a multiple-
ontologies approach has inherent advantages when dealing
with conflicts. In particular in our ORP-based approach, mul-
tiple ontologies are required in order to look at the structure
of proofs of inconsistencies, i.e., at how conflicts arise be-
tween particular sets of theorems that match our diagnostic
patterns (called triggers or trigger formulae in GALILEO). In
a consistent ontology it is significant that a particular trigger
formula is provable. In an inconsistent one, all trigger for-
mulae would be provable, so we would learn nothing. Since
the collection of trigger formulae is itself inconsistent, then
we need to divide them into consistent subsets and allocate
them between consistent ontologies in order for the trigger
process to be meaningful and for our ORP technique to work.
As mentioned above we focus on an ORPs method rather
than on the more widely used MUPS method because we are
interested in signature changes, not (just) axiom deletion.
MUPS-based approaches are well suited to axiom deletion as
they identify exactly the axioms that are deletion candidates.
But the ORP triggers are better aimed at signature change
because they identify precisely the concepts whose repre-
sentation needs change. This is because ORP’s diagnoses
identify the point at which the implicit inconsistency be-
comes explicit, whereas MUPS identify an underlying cause,
if this cause is faulty axioms rather than faulty concepts.
ORPs open up the new possibility of many kinds of syntacti-
cal manipulations (e.g., splitting a function, changing its ar-
ity, etc.) to re-establish global consistency. Note incidentally
that a MUPS-based approach like (Ji et al., 2009), as well
as most belief-revision-based approaches, cannot fully ex-
ploit the potential inherent in the multiple-ontologies case.
They too are better suited to the retraction of axioms and
mappings, or they attempt the intricate modification of the
logical structure of an ontology on a limited logical basis.
Also, such approaches do not consider the modification of
the ontology’s signature. Certainly, ontology evolution re-
quires changes to both the axioms and the signature. Our
ORPs focus more on signature changes than axiom changes
because our empirical studies identified these as more fun-
damental. The ORPs do, though, also make axiom changes.
If intricate changes were proved necessary, they could be
encompassed within our richer HOL representation. In that
sense, there is a degree of complementarity between our
work and traditional DL approaches.
For what concerns again the second, as well as the third
limitation found in the literature, i.e., the inherent lack of
generality, the GALILEO system bases automated ontology
evolution on the use of HOL. In order to do more than retract-
ing axioms and to achieve the subtler diagnosis and repairs
mentioned above, a meta-logic more expressive than DL or
FOL is required. Modelling ORPs in HOL allows for the exis-
tential quantification over ontologies and functions, which is
useful in domains containing many ontologies/theories, e.g.,
natural sciences and general real-world semantics. More-
over, the polymorphism of symbols employed in ORPs per-
mits their high generality. HOL formulae can abstract over
types, number of arguments, etc. therefore using HOL as a
meta-logic for ontology evolution in the long run facilitates
the formulation of declarative theories of ontology evolu-
tion – as opposed to the algorithms usually found in the DL
literature. In GALILEO, meta-level inference consists only of
matching object-level formulae against the trigger patterns,
and then applying the repairs dictated by the repair patterns.
These inferences are entirely automatic. By using HOL pat-
terns we can describe ontology evolution in a succinct and
transparent way that might be disguised in an algorithmic
presentation – especially if the lack of expressivity in the al-
gorithm meant that it had to have separate cases to deal with
different types, arities and orders. Note also that the repaired
ontologies should not usually be a logical consequence of
the originals, since the originals are often globally inconsis-
tent and the repaired ones should not be. The next section
provides more detail on using HOL to represent ontologies
and their evolution.
An additional consideration for preferring HOL over DL
or FOL is its expressivity as an object language, i.e., the pos-
sibility of representing directly, rather than as roles in con-
cepts, mathematical knowledge. Many concepts in Physics
are naturally higher-order. For instance, differential and in-
tegral calculus are 2nd-order functions; the distribution of
matter in a galaxy is represented as a function from space-
time to mass; the orbit of a planet is represented as a function
from space-time to velocity; etc. It is only during reason-
ing within an object-level HOL theory that interaction is re-
quired with the theorem prover. It is unlikely that this prob-
lem could be cured by a change to a less expressive logic. We
know of no decidable logic capable of carrying out the nec-
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essary mathematical manipulations. Yet, having Mathemat-
ics as part of the representation allows to reason about the
constraints underlying a given DL typology. Consider, for in-
stance, a DL typology such as the Ontology of Astronomical
Object Types (Cambresy et al., 2010). Here the roles that,
for instance, represent measurements of brightness, polar-
ization, period, velocity, mass etc. are each represented sep-
arately as properties of an object, which is classified based
on the values (of combinations of) such properties found in
a database. It is not possible, though, to represent the math-
ematical relations between these properties. This makes the
representation less flexible and limits the possibility of rea-
soning about the typologies and adapt them to, for instance,
progress in Physics, because it is not possible to define the
properties underlying a typology as functions of one another.
In summary, the use of HOL in describing ORPs enables
each ORP to diagnose and repair a wide range of faulty Physics
theories, which may involve objects of different type and
order. In less expressive logics this generality is not avail-
able, leading to the need for ad hoc mechanisms for differ-
ent classes of example. It could be argued that, compared
to DL approaches, automation is lost in the object-level rea-
soning within each physical theory, because, as we shall see
from Section 7, the richness of reasoning in HOL requires
human interaction. Nevertheless, this object-level reasoning
is largely algebraic manipulation, of a kind that could not be
represented in DL logics. So, a superficial contrast between
decidable, totally automatic DL reasoning and this HOL rea-
soning is misleading. Section 8.4 discusses and illustrates
the degree of automation we have achieved in GALILEO.
3 Evolution by Ontology Repair Plans and Contexts
At the heart of our approach to ontology evolution lies the
notion of Ontology Repair Plan. These are generic combi-
nations of diagnosis patterns and repair operations formu-
lated in HOL that guide the evolution of an ontology. The
diagnostic component takes as input two or more ontolo-
gies, and checks whether specific logical conditions (e.g.,
a contradiction or a redundancy) hold between the ontolo-
gies. In the positive, the repair component is triggered. By
grouping these meta-level operations, ORPs trade-off com-
pleteness against reduction in search. The following sub-
sections explain and define: the use of HOL for represent-
ing ontologies (Types, Terms, Type Inheritance, Free Vari-
ables); the notion of ontologies as contexts (Higher-Order
Ontologies, Combining Ontologies, Local and Global In-
consistency, Ontology Fault); the use of multiple ontolo-
gies (Bridging Ontologies, Factorised Representation); the
basic mechanisms for ontology evolution (Ontology Repair
Plans).
3.1 Representing ontologies and their evolution in HOL
Ontology originated in Philosophy, where it is the philo-
sophical study of the nature of being, existence or reality.
The word “ontology” has been adopted and adapted within
Computing as meaning a formal representation of the con-
cepts within a domain and the relationships between those
concepts. Many ontologies consist only of a classification of
the types of object or relationships within a domain, perhaps
arranged hierarchically. Some consist of sets of RDF triples
representing a relationship between two objects. Richer on-
tologies can consist of sets of formulae in a Description
Logic, such as the Web Ontology Language OWL, or a First
Order Logic, such as KIF. We can, thus, see that there are a
range of interpretations of “ontology”:
– from a single description of the nature of reality to mul-
tiple, perhaps conflicting, descriptions of many smaller
domains;
– from foundational (or upper) conceptualizations cover-
ing very general abstract notions, such as space, time,
objects, processes, qualities, regions, etc., to domain-spe-
cific ones describing specific versions of such general
notions.
– from a simple set of type declarations to a representation
of world knowledge (where this knowledge is similar yet
relatively more prone to changes than the knowledge en-
coded in foundational or domain ontologies);
– from a simple classification to a rich logic.
In GALILEO we have interpreted “ontology” in an in-
clusive way to encompass any representation of knowledge,
usually as a logical theory. We have chosen a logic that is
rich enough to represent, in a natural way, both the object-
level concepts and relationships of Physics as well as the
meta-level concepts and relationships of ontology evolution
processes. As we will see, this argues for a polymorphic,
typed, higher order logic for both purposes. Polymorphic
means that some terms of the language can have more than
one type. This will be achieved by including variables rang-
ing over types in their type declarations.
The choice required a trade-off between inferential com-
plexity and representational richness. In order not to bur-
den ourselves with knowledge encoding problems, we have
favoured representational richness. The price we have paid
is that inference must often be interactive. When ontology
evolution is much better understood, it will be time to in-
crease the degree of automation by exploring the potential
for representation of Physics and ontology evolution in a
more restricted logic.
The formal definition3 of our polymorphic, typed, higher
order logic are given below.
3 Definitions are denoted by the symbol ::= throughout.
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Definition 1 (Types) The following BNF describes polymor-
phic types:
T ::= V | C | T ⇒ T | T ×T | Set(T )
where V is the set of type variables, C the set of type con-
stants; τ⇒ τ′ is the type of functions from objects of type τ
to objects of type τ′; τ× τ′ is the type of products from ob-
jects of type τ to objects of type τ′; and, Set(τ) is the type
of sets of objects of type τ. We will use the Greek letter τ,
possibly subscripted or primed, to range over types.
Note that the set of type constants, C , depends on the signa-
ture of the ontology.
Particular type constants that we use below are, for in-
stance, bool, for the booleans, and R for the real numbers.
Definition 2 (Terms) The following BNF describes terms of
the logic.
T ::= V |C | T (T ) | λV.T
where V is the set of term variables, C the set of term con-
stants. We will use the Roman letter t, possibly subscripted
or primed, to range over terms. We will write t:τ to declare
term t to have type τ.
Note that the set of constants, C, depends on the signature of
the ontology.
We will assume that C contains: the truth values >:bool
(true) and ⊥:bool (false); the standard logic connectives,
such as ∧:bool ⇒ bool ⇒ bool; and the quantifiers, such
as ∃:(τ⇒ bool)⇒ bool. Most ontologies will also contain,
for each type τ, an equivalence relation =τ :τ⇒ τ⇒ bool,
a partial order relation <τ :τ⇒ τ⇒ bool and additive and
subtractive functions +τ,−τ:τ⇒ τ⇒ τ. Note that several of
these term constants are polymorphic, i.e., their types con-
tain type variables. This allows us to overload these con-
stants so that they apply to objects of many different types.
This is essential in allowing us to formalise generic ontol-
ogy repair plans that are applicable across a wide range of
different areas of Physics.
Definition 3 (Type Inheritance) Terms inherit their types
according to the following two rules:




Definition 4 (Free Variables) The set , FV (t), of free vari-
ables of a term, t, are defined recursively as follows:
∀x ∈V. FV (x) ::= {x}
∀t, t ′ ∈ T. FV (t ′(t)) ::= FV (t ′)∪FV (t)
∀c ∈C. FV (c) ::= {}
∀t ∈ T,x ∈V. FV (λx.t) ::= FV (t)\{x}.
The above definitions of types and terms are in, so called,
curried form, where all functions are regarded as unary. Cur-
ried types and terms can be inter-converted as follows:
– The curried type (τ1⇒ . . .⇒ (τn⇒ τ) . . .) can be written
in uncurried form as τ1× . . .×τn⇒ τ and vice versa; and
– The curried term t(t1) . . .(tn) can be written in uncurried
form as t(t1, . . . , tn) and vice versa.
3.2 Ontologies as Contexts
ORPs operate on higher-order ontologies that are formalized
and implemented as contexts (Ballarin, 2004).
Definition 5 (Higher-Order Ontologies) LetO be the meta-
type of ontologies. A higher-order ontology, O:O, is a pair
〈S,A〉, where S is the signature of O and A is the set of ax-
ioms. We define Sig(O) ::= S and Ax(O) ::= A. The signa-
ture, S, is a set of type declarations for all the constants in
C, i.e., the elements of S are of the form c:τ, where c ∈ C
and τ ∈ T . We will assume that a potentially infinite set of
variables is provided for each type in T . With this assump-
tion, the signature defines a set of terms T . These terms are
called the language of the ontology, denoted Lang(O). The
set of sentences of the ontology, Φ, are the subset of terms
that have type bool and no free variables, i.e., Φ ::= {φ ∈
T |φ:bool ∧ FV (φ) = {}} To reduce clutter, we will some-
times omit outermost universal quantifiers from sentences.
An axiom, a∈A, is a sentence that is assumed to be true.
When the axioms are closed under the rules of inference they
define the set of theorems of the ontology, denoted T h(O). If
a sentence φ is a theorem of ontology O we write O ` φ.
An ontology O is said to be inconsistent if ⊥ is a theo-
rem, i.e., O ` ⊥.
To reduce clutter we adopt the convention that Sig(Oi) is
abbreviated to Si and Ax(Oi) is abbreviated to Ai. Note that,
depending on the context, Si and Ai may refer to the local
signatures and axioms, respectively.
O ` φ is an example of a meta-assertion, i.e., a sentence
of a meta-ontology. A meta-ontology is a higher-order on-
tology whose domain is other ontologies, i.e., in which the
constants denote object-level expressions, names of on-
tologies and models, etc. Ontology evolution consists of si-
multaneous inference in both object- and meta-ontologies.
For our application, the meta-level is responsible for en-
coding the object-level logic and the ORPs. Object-logics
are formed and manipulated by Isabelle’s meta-logic, Is-
abelle/Pure, which serves as a logical framework for en-
coding arbitrary object-logics. However, the meta-logic in
which the ORPs are expressed require more than just manip-
ulating terms, but also generating proof obligations for di-
agnosis, gathering the preferred diagnosis, analysing depen-
dencies between ontologies, and so forth. The meta-logic in
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which the ORPs are expressed is encoded in the ML (Meta-
Language) level, which interfaces with Pure.
An example of a polymorphic axiom inter-relating mul-
tiple polymorphic constants is:
∀x,y,z:τ. x+τ y =τ z ⇐⇒ z−τ x =τ y
So, whatever the domain of application, we may insist on a
fixed relationship between =τ, +τ and −τ.
The rules of inference of this logic are the natural de-
duction rules provided by the Isabelle theorem prover for
HOL and are as documented in Nipkow et al. (2002)[ch5].
The semantics of the logic are described in Gordon and Pitts
(1994). This semantics defines the concept of interpretation
of an ontology O as giving a meaning to each c:τ ∈ Sig(O)
and, hence, a truth value to each sentence φ ∈ Lang(O). We
write M |= φ if φ is assigned > by the interpretation M. If
∀φ ∈ Ax(O). M |= φ then M is said to be a model of O. We
can regard the real world as defining an interpretation that is
intended to be a model of all our ontologies. We will refer
to this interpretation as the preferred model. Note that the
very notion of reality is a deep philosophical issue. In our
approach we adopt a deterministic view that responds to the
needs of a logical representation. A logical model is fully
determined by the truth value of the ground, atomic formu-
lae. We can treat the real world as a model in the following
sense. To discover the truth value of a ground, atomic formu-
lae we conduct an experimental observation designed to dis-
cover its truth value. Of course, a change of representation
will affect how such experiments are designed. For instance,
if we believe that the value of a function does not depend
on the day of the week then we will observe its presumed
unique value on any convenient day. If we subsequently de-
cide that the function does vary with the day, then we will
need to take seven different observations. Thus the preferred
model will subtly change as the ontology evolves, but will
still correspond to the real world as currently understood at
any given time.
Definition 6 (Combining Ontologies) The combination,
Ox⊕Oy , of two ontologies, Ox and Oy is defined as:
Ox⊕Oy ::= 〈Sig(Ox)∪Sig(Oy),Ax(Ox)∪Ax(Oy)〉
provided no clash of constant types arises, i.e.,
∀c ∈C. c:τx ∈ Sig(Ox)∧ c:τy ∈ Sig(Oy) =⇒ τx = τy
⊕ :O×O⇒O is a meta-constant.
Note that the language of the combined ontologies con-
tains the union of their languages and the axioms of the com-
bined ontologies contains the union of their axioms.
The associativity and commutativity of ⊕ follows triv-
ially from the associativity and commutativity of ∪. We can,
therefore, drop the parentheses from O1⊕ (O2 . . .(On−1⊕
On) . . .) and write O1⊕ . . .⊕On unambiguously.
Definition 7 (Local vs Global (In)consistency) Consider
the set of ontologies {Oi:O|1≤ i≤ n}. The set is said to be
locally (in)consistent if each Oi is (in)consistent. It is said to
be globally (in)consistent if O1⊕ . . .⊕On is (in)consistent.
Definition 8 (Ontology Fault) By an ontology fault we mean
one of the following two cases:
Over-specification: It is possible to prove a false theorem,
i.e., O ` φ but M |= ¬φ, where M is a preferred model
of ontology O and φ is a sentence in Lang(O).
A special case of over-specification is inconsistency,
i.e., O ` ⊥, where ⊥ represents false, since ⊥ is false
in all models. Note that inconsistency would arise if we
tried to combine two ontologies, say Ox and Oy, where
there exists a sentence φ such that Ox ` φ and Oy ` ¬φ,
since ⊥ would then be a theorem of the combined ontol-
ogy Ox⊕Oy.
Under-specification: It is impossible to prove a true sen-
tence, i.e., O 0 φ but M |= φ, where M is a preferred
model of ontology O and φ is a sentence in Lang(O).
A special case of under-specification is redundancy,
i.e., that O 0 t1 = t2 but M |= t1 = t2, where M is a pre-
ferred model of ontology O and t1 and t2 are terms of the
same type in Lang(O).
3.3 Multiple Ontologies
Most work in the area of ontological fault diagnosis attempts
to detect a fault from a single ontology. Even though some
work with networked ontologies (Ji et al., 2009), the net-
work is typically collapsible into a single, large ontology.
Our method for determining whether the given ontologies
require repair focuses on the identification of the pattern
describing an underlying fault across multiple ontologies,
which is the purpose of the trigger formulae in ORPs. Ef-
fectively, a single ontology setup will render our proposed
method of fault diagnosis useless. This means that a rep-
resentation containing multiple ontologies are essential to
performing precise diagnosis of ontological faults.
A goal in the implementation of GALILEO is to ease
the restriction on the languages used by multiple ontolo-
gies, enabling a more flexible approach to modelling. It is
fairly commonplace in dynamic, unregulated environments
to deal with ontologies that exhibit different languages; for
instance, agents fail to communicate with each other due to
a lack of a shared understanding of the languages, which is
caused by a heterogeneity of languages. If we regard each
agent as having its own separate ontology, then such het-
erogeneity arises across multiple discrepant ontologies. To
handle heterogeneous ontologies, we construct bridging on-
tologies.
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Definition 9 (Bridging Ontologies) A bridge ontology,




Sig(Oi),{Ψ j(φ j1, . . . ,φ jn)| j ∈ [m]}〉
provided no clash of constant types arises, i.e.,
∀c∈C,∀i, j∈ [n]. c:τi ∈ Sig(Oi)∧c:τ j ∈ Sig(O j) =⇒ τi = τ j
where φi ∈ Lang(Oi) for i ∈ [n], where [n] = {i|1≤ i≤ n}.
That is, the signature of the bridge ontology is the union
of signatures of the n bridged ontologies; the set of axioms of
the bridge ontology consists of m sentences that each asserts
a relationship between formulae in the languages of the n
bridged ontologies.
We can now combine BO1...On with one or more of the Oi
in order to make its theorems comparable to one or more of
the remaining O j. Note that combining BO1...On with all of
the Ois will often create an inconsistent ontology.
Note that the notion of bridge used in this article as well
as the axioms that are within a bridge resolve any linguistic
differences between multiple ontologies. This notion is com-
parable to both the notions of lifting axioms and of bridging
rules, which were proven equivalent in (Bouquet and Ser-
afini, 2003).
3.4 Factorisation
In order to design a highly general mechanism for detect-
ing faults in multiple ontologies, we must enable at least
some inference to be performed across even globally in-
consistent ontologies. For instance, given a predictive ontol-
ogy containing definitions and a sensory ontology contain-
ing pure empirical data, a conflict is deducible only if the
definitions are instantiated by the empirical data. Clearly,
reasoning with the combination of these globally inconsis-
tent ontologies is virtually meaningless, but the inconsis-
tency itself may be circumvented by excluding certain ax-
ioms from the combination. Our solution is to enable ORPs
to be performed not on the original input ontologies them-
selves, but on the ontologies in a factorised representation
of the original.
Definition 10 (Factorised Representation) The factorised
representation F (O) of an ontology O:O is defined as:
F (O) ::= {O′ | O′  O}
where
〈S′,A′〉  〈S,A〉 ⇐⇒ S′ = S∧A′ ⊆ A∧A′ 6= /0.
A factorised representation of an ontology with n axioms is
essentially a set of ontologies in which each ontology con-
tains a unique k-combination of original axioms for 1≤ k≤
n, The idea of working with a factorised representation of
ontologies is loosely based on the concept of a factorised
representation of a set of independent variables in Bayesian
Networks (Jensen, 1996). Consequently, each ontology in
a factorised representation is a sub-ontology of the ontol-
ogy being factorised. The models satisfying any subset of
the original axioms must also satisfy an ontology in the fac-
torised representation and the models satisfying any ontol-
ogy in the factorised representation must also satisfy a sub-
set of the original axioms. Sub-ontologies have been proven
useful and adopted to solve specific reasoning tasks about
ontologies (Haase et al., 2005; Du et al., 2008). We will use
the superscript ′ and multiples thereof to denote the ontolo-
gies in a factorised representation, e.g., O′, O′′, i.e. are sub-
ontologies of the original ontology, O.
Note the following rather trivial facts, which allow us to
describe below the relationship between the preferred model
of an ontology and the models the ontology’s factorised rep-
resentation.
Proposition 1 Given an ontology O:O, the following holds:
∀ /0 6= A′ ⊆ Ax(O). ∃O′ ∈ F (O). Ax(O′) = A′.
Proposition 2 Given an ontology O:O, the following holds:
∀O′ ∈ F (O). ∃A′ ⊆ Ax(O). Ax(O′) = A′.
From Propositions 1 and 2, we claim that the preferred model
of an ontology, which itself should be a model of at least one
of the original axioms, is a model of at least one of the on-
tologies in the corresponding factorised representation. This
is because the factorised representation must contain all pos-
sible sub-ontologies of the corresponding ontology. Work-
ing with a factorised representation, therefore, essentially
enables reasoning to be performed over any subset of the
axioms of the input ontologies. In the case where the envi-
ronment contains multiple factorised representations, each
corresponding to a different input ontology, an ontology in
one factorised representation could be combined with one
in another. In effect, a subset of the axioms of an input on-
tology can now be combined with the whole of another in-
put ontology. This is a powerful approach and increases the
generality of the repair mechanism, because it enables some
reasoning across globally inconsistent ontologies – the rea-
soning can be focussed on only those ontologies in the fac-
torised representations that do not contain the axioms that
would otherwise induce global inconsistency. The combina-
tion operator ⊕ enables the reuse of ontologies for building
factorised representations as networks, so that the number of
ontologies created can be kept to a minimum.
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3.5 Ontology Repair Plans
The general notion of ORP in terms of the logic defined
above is the following.
Definition 11 (Ontology Repair Plans) An ontology repair
plan is a pair 〈Trigger,Repair〉, where:
Trigger: is a set of meta assertions of the form O ` φ or
O 0 φ which collectively create an ontology fault.
Repair: is a set of repair operations of the form ν(O) ::=
pi(O), where ν(O) denotes a repaired ontology and pi
generically is a generic operation on the signature and/or
axioms of the original ontology O. If each O is replaced
by ν(O) in Trigger to form ν(Trigger) then ν(Trigger)
no longer creates the ontology fault detected in Trigger4.
The signature of the repaired ontology, Sig(ν(O)), may
contain type declarations for constants that are not declared
in the signature of the original ontology, Sig(O), and vice
versa. One consequence is that a model of O may not be
even be an interpretation of ν(O) and vice versa. This makes
it difficult to give a model-based semantics to the operations
of ontology repair plans. Note that this problem is caused
by the inclusion of signature change in ontology evolution
and not by the use of higher-order logic. We are exploring
other possibilities, but assigning a semantics to our version
of higher-order ontology evolution remains further work.
In the following sections we discuss three ORPs, their
formalization, implementation and testing. The ORP called
Where’s My Stuff? (WMS) is triggered in situations where
a theoretical prediction in Ox conflicts with sensory infor-
mation derived from experiments in Oy possibly through a
bridging ontology B. In the case where bridging is required,
Oy can be instantiated to a combination of B and the sensory
ontology in consideration using the ⊕ operator. WMS de-
ploys an addition-strategy that is quite common in Physics.
For instance, in order to account for unpredictable yet ob-
served gravitational behaviours in the orbit of a planet or in
the stellar orbital velocity in a galaxy, astronomers postulate
the presence of an additional unobserved planet or, resp., of
dark matter. Accordingly, WMS redefines the contradictory
function (in the examples, the functions orbit, resp., orbital
velocity) as the sum of a visible part (i.e. the amount calcu-
lated by the original function) and an invisible part (i.e. the
amount that can only indirectly be observed).
The ORP called Inconstancy is triggered in situations
where sensory information is derived from experiments run
under different circumstances Oy.1 . . .Oy.n. If such experi-
ments present variations (e.g. variations in temperature) in
the value of a function stuff which, according to Ox, should
be constant (e.g. the volume to pressure ratio of a gas), In-
constancy repairs the theoretical ontology by changing the
4 Although, other ontology faults may still remain to be detected and
repaired, as well faults newly introduced by the repair plan.
signature and making the constant quantity dependent on the
varying quantity.
The ORP called Unite is triggered in situations where the
observations in the sensory ontology Oy for two possibly
distinct entities in the theoretical ontology Ox fully match,
and this is grounds for identifying the two functions as one.
Unite is the converse of WMS: it is not triggered by a contra-
diction, but by an equality of two stuff s relative to a chosen
defining property; the repair is to equate in Ox the two stuff s,
so as to eliminate the redundancy.
Other ORPs perform other types of repairs, such as uni-
fying two theoretical ontologies; changing the type structure
of a function to let it fit a given dataset; drawing an analogy
between two theoretical ontologies; skolemizing a theorem
containing an existential quantifier and transforming a set of
unary predicates into a unary function. Some of these ORPs
are discussed as part of further work in Section 9.
Finally, as further discussed in Section 8.3, some of the
diagnoses found by GALILEO suggest that experimental rather
than predictive error is the cause of the fault. Therefore, al-
though the accent of the ORPs discussed below is on repair-
ing the predictive elements of the ontologies, a repair may
principally work on the experimental ontology, correspond-
ing to a faulty experiment, rather than on the theoretical one.
4 The Where’s My Stuff? ORP
The Where’s My Stuff? ORP, described in Figure 3, is trig-
gered when the predicted value returned by a function con-
flicts with the observed value of the same function. It as-
sumes two ontologies: an ontology Ox representing the cur-
rent state of a predictive Physics theory and a heterogeneous
ontology Oy representing some sensory information arising
from an experiment. If the ontologies are heterogeneous, the
reasoning performed may possibly involve a bridging ontol-
ogy mapping between heterogeneous formulae across on-
tologies. Suppose the function f measures some property of
stuff . There are two possible ways to identify the conflict:
with equation (15), where f (stuff ) is equal or less than a
particular value in Oy, or with equation (16), where f (stuff )
is equal or greater than a particular value in Ox. The repair is
to split stuff into three: visible stuff , invisible stuff , and to-
tal stuff , defining invisible stuff in terms of total and visible
stuff s in the repaired Ox, ν(Ox), as in equations (17, 20). The
new Oy, ν(Oy), is the same as Oy except for the renaming of
stuff to stuff vis, as in equation (21).
4.1 WMS’s application to the discovery of latent heat
Until the second half of the 18th century, the chemical/physical
notion of heat was conflated with the notion of temperature
and it was seen as a function of a temporal quantity, e.g.
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Trigger: Ox is the predictive ontology and Oy is the observational one.
If f (stuff ) has two different values in Ox and Oy, then the follow-
ing formula will be triggered:
∃Ox,Oy:O, τ,τ′:Types, f :τ⇒ τ′, stuff :τ, v:τ′.
(Ox ` f (stuff )>τ′ v ∧ Oy ` f (stuff )≤τ′ v) ∨ (15)
(Ox ` f (stuff )≥τ′ v ∧ Oy ` f (stuff )<τ′ v) (16)
where O ` φ means that formula φ is a theorem of ontology O;
t:Types means t is a type; o:O means o is an ontology; >τ′ is the
greater-than operator for τ′.
Repair: Two new kinds of stuff and a definition of the invisible stuff
are introduced.
stuffσinvis ::= stuff −τ stuffσvis (17)
When stuff is a constant, the substitution σvis just replaces it with
a new constant standing for the visible stuff; when stuff is com-
pound, the replacement is more complex, but still automatable.
Similar remarks hold for σinvis.
Let ν(Ox) and ν(Oy) be the repaired ontologies. The signatures
for the new ontologies are updated in terms of those of the old as
follows:
Sig(ν(Ox)) ::= {stuff vis:τ,stuff invis:τ}∪Sig(Ox) (18)
Sig(ν(Oy)) ::= {stuff vis:τ}∪Sig(Oy)\{stuff :τ} (19)
The axioms for the new ontologies are updated in terms of those
of the old as follows:
Ax(ν(Ox)) ::= { stuffσinvis ::= stuff −τ stuffσvis } ∪ Ax(Ox) (20)
Ax(ν(Oy)) ::= {φ{stuff/stuffσvis} | φ ∈ Ax(B) } (21)
To effect the repair, the axioms of ν(Ox) are the same as those
of Ox except for the addition of the new definition; the axioms of
ν(Oy) are the same as those of Oy except for the renaming of the
original stuff to the visible stuff. Note that in case the value of
f (stuff ) in Ox is smaller than that in Oy, Oy is repaired as Ox in
(20) and Ox as Oy in (21). Because Ox and Oy can be instantiated
to a combination of ontologies, if the instantiation of Ox is a com-
bination of ontologies and some of these ontologies are used in the
instantiation of Oy, then they are excluded from being repaired by
(21).
Fig. 3: The Where’s My Stuff? ORP
flow (Wiser and Carey, 1983). Flow was the cause of the
change of temperature of a physical body put in direct con-
tact with another physical body at a different temperature.
This pre-modern view of heat and temperature can be ratio-
nally reconstructed in the following equation:
∆T ≡ Q = m×∆t (22)
where Q is the heat absorbed or released by a body and is
equivalent to ∆T , the body’s difference in temperature at the
start and at the end of the flow, m is the body’s mass, ∆t is
the flow of heat, measured over time, from the hotter to the
cooler body.
In the period 1759-1763 the discoveries of specific and of
latent heat by Joseph Black brought a revision of the view
underlying equation (22) and established the modern view,
based on a distinction between the quantity of heat trans-
ferred to a physical body and the rise in temperature under-
gone by the body. On the one hand, the notion of specific
heat capacity (1759) accounted for the fact that when equal
masses of different materials at equal temperatures absorb
the same quantity of heat (i.e. when exposed to equal flows)
they undergo different rises in temperature. This is due to a
material specific capacity constant c. On the other hand, the
case of single-substance bodies led to the formulation of the
theory of latent heat (1761). A melting block of, for instance,
ice releases heat at constant temperature. Such heat is pro-
portional to a constant L which is specific to the body’s ma-
terial as well as to the phase-transition. This modern view of
heat and temperature is represented by the following equa-
tion:
Q = m×∆T × c+m×L (23)
where Q is the heat put into or taken out of the body, m is
the mass of the body, c is the specific heat capacity of the
body’s substance, ∆T is the change in temperature, L is the
specific latent heat of the substance during the considered
phase-transition.
Note that the evolution from equation (22) to equation
(23) marks a shift in the meaning of the variables: Q is not
measured solely by the temperature difference of the body,
∆T (which now has its own place in the equation). Also,
there is no need any more to make explicit reference to a
temporal notion such as flow (∆t).
Figure 4 represents the state of the theory of heat ac-
cording to equation (22) and to the experimental results that
led to the introduction of latent heat. At the top, S1,2 con-
tains the shared signature of the two ontologies of Physics,
O1 and O2. For instance, Melting is defined as a subtype of
event (Evt), Start as a function from Evt to the type of the
real numbers R. Note that in this article, wherever appropri-
ate, models of Physics laws and of experiments make use
of an event-based representation, which makes them com-
patible with the Event Calculus (EC) (Kowalski and Sergot,
1986). O1, whose signature is S1, contains new signature el-
ements such as the duration of an event (Duration) and rep-
resents equation (22) by equation (26). It also contains value
assertions for Mass and Duration that allow this ontology to
predict that the quantity of Heat released by H2O during
the Melting event is greater than zero. On the other hand,
O2, whose signature is S2, represents the experimental set-
up: it contains other signature elements for the instruments
(such as ThmIn for the thermometer used in the measure-
ments) and it defines the difference in temperature of a body
(TempDiff ) as the difference in height (Hght) of the mer-
cury column (MerOf ) of a thermometer stuck in the body
throughout an event. It also contains value assertions for the
relevant observations of the height of the mercury.
Bridge BO1 ′,O2 ′ aligns heterogeneous formulae between
sub-ontologies O′1 and O
′
2; for instance, formulae containing
Heat in O′1 and formulae containing TempDiff in O
′
2. This
allows the contradiction with O1 to become explicit to match
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S1,2 ::=
{Mass:Obj⇒ Evt⇒ R,Melting:Evt,Start:Evt⇒ R, . . .} (24)
S1 ::=
{Duration:Evt⇒ Time,Heat:Obj⇒ Evt⇒ R,
HeatDiff :Obj⇒ Evt⇒ R} (25)
A1 ::=









Hght(MerOf (ThmIn(H2O,Start(Melting)))) = 5, (31)
Hght(MerOf (ThmIn(H2O,End(Melting)))) = 5} (32)
Sig(BO1 ′ ,O2 ′ ) ::= S1∪S2∪S1,2 (33)
Ax(BO1 ′ ,O2 ′ ) ::= {∀o,e.Mass(o,e)> 0 =⇒
Heat(o,e) = TempDiff (o,e)} (34)
Fig. 4: Initial model of the Latent Heat case study. Si denotes
the local signature of Oi and Ai denotes the set of local ax-
ioms of Oi. Ontologies O1′ and O2′ are two sub-ontologies
of O1 and O2, respectively. O1′ contains only the axiom (26)
and O2′ contains all axioms of O2. Bridge BO1 ′,O2 ′ merges
O1′’s and O2′’s signatures, which are the same as those of
O1 and O2, and maps their concepts, for instance, Heat, the
amount of heat absorbed or released by a body, is mapped
on TempDiff , the temperature difference undergone by the
body. This allows the contradiction between O1 and O2 via
the bridge BO1 ′,O2 ′ about the value of Heat to become ex-
plicit to match the WMS trigger formula, because during a
Melting event there is no change in temperature, although
O1 predicts it.
the WMS trigger formula (15):
O1′′ ` Heat(H2O,Melting)> 0 (35)
O2′⊕BO1 ′,O2 ′ ⊕O1′ ` Heat(H2O,Melting) = 0 (36)
where O1′′ is a sub-ontology in the factorised representa-
tion of O1 containing all of the original axioms such that
the above holds. Table 1 outlines the sub-ontologies gener-
ated by the factorisation of O1. Only with O1′ the value of








Table 1: Axioms of all sub-ontologies generated by the fac-
torisation of O1.
and the bridge; the combination with O1′′ will induce incon-
sistency and the others do not contain the relevant axioms to
allow the inference.
Given the substitution:
{O1′′/Ox,BO1 ′,O2 ′ ⊕O2′/Oy,λx.x(H2O,Melting)/ f ,
Heat/stuff ,0/v}
WMS repairs the two ontologies as in ν(Ox) (i.e. by adding
to O1′′ the distinction between visible and invisible Heat)
and as in ν(BO1 ′,O2 ′) (i.e. by renaming in BO1 ′,O2 ′ all occur-
rences of Heat to Heatvis). Note that there are no occurrences
of Heat in O2′ so it doesn’t receive repair.
Ax(ν(O1′′)) ::= {Heatinvis ::= Heat−Heatvis}∪
Ax(O1′′) (37)
Ax(ν(BO1 ′,O2 ′)) ::= {φ{Heat/Heatvis}|φ ∈ Ax(BO1 ′,O2 ′)}(38)
The effect of repair is not limited to ν(O1′′) but is propa-
gated to the entire corresponding factorised representation.
Every sub-ontology in the representation receives the same
treatment of repair, i.e.:
∀O ∈ F (O1).
Ax(ν(O)) ::= Heatinvis ::= Heat−Heatvis}∪Ax(O)
∀O ∈ F (BO1 ′,O2 ′).
Ax(ν(O)) ::= {φ{Heat/Heatvis}|φ ∈ Ax(O)}.
4.2 WMS’s application to the postulation of dark matter
The theoretical existence of dark matter is based on various
sources of evidence, including the rotational velocities of
stars in spiral galaxies, which exceeds the predicted orbital
velocities5, as first observed by Rubin (Rubin et al., 1980).
5 It is assumed that observed orbital velocity and rotational velocity
for stars are the same. Observations were initially based on gas clouds
(HII regions) rather than stars, and only later were the observations
based on both gases and stars. We simplify the Physics by considering
only stars.
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Given the observed distribution of mass in these galaxies,
Newtonian dynamics predicts that orbital velocities decrease
inversely with the square root of the distance from the galac-
tic centre, or the radius (equation (42)). However, the ob-
served velocity was almost constant out to large radii. Ru-
bin’s conclusion was that some invisible matter exerts a grav-
itational force on these stars, causing the unexpectedly high
orbital velocities. The theoretical notions that play a role in
this case are Newton’s second law of motion (equation (39)),
the law of gravitational attraction in circular orbits (equa-
tion (40)) and the law of centripetal acceleration (equation
(41)), which combined allow to derive the orbital velocity
of a body (equation (42)) at distance r from the body at the
centre of the orbit.














where F is the force applied to an orbiting body, m is the
mass of the body, a is its acceleration, M is the mass of the
body at the centre of the orbit, G is the gravitational con-
stant, r is the radius, or distance between the orbiting body
and the body at the centre of the orbit, vorb is the orbital
velocity.
On the experimental side, orbital velocity is calculated
as rotational velocity, based on spectrographic data and us-










where z is the redshift of a radiation λ with respect to a ref-
erence λ0, c is the speed of light, vrad is the radial velocity of
a body (e.g. a star) along the line of observation, vsys is the
velocity of the system (e.g. a galaxy) to which the observed
body belongs, vrot is the rotational velocity of the object.
Figure 5 represents the state of the theory of galactic
orbital velocity according to equation (42) and to the ob-
servations yielded by equations (43) to (45), which led to
the postulation of dark matter. At the top, S3,4 contains the
shared signature where, for instance, the type Rad for dis-
tances from the galactic centre is defined as a function that
maps the product of objects (e.g. stars) and object sets (e.g.
galaxies) and an observation event onto the type Dst for dis-
tances (this in turn maps onto real numbers). Note that S3,4
is assumed to inherit, from some higher mathematical on-
tologies, knowledge about shapes of curves, e.g., UpFlat
S3,4 ::=
{UpFlat:R⇒ R,Rad:(Obj∗Obj Set)⇒ Evt⇒ Dst . . .} (46)
S3 ::=
{GphA:Gly⇒ Evt⇒ R,OV:Gly⇒ Evt⇒ R, . . .} (47)
A3 ::=





∀e:Evt. GphA(Glxy71,e) = OV(Glxy71,e), (49)
G = 6.673×10−11, (50)
∑s ∈ Glxy71Rad(Star1,Glxy71).Mass(s,Obs1) = 100, (51)
∑s ∈ Glxy71Rad(Star9,Glxy71).Mass(s,Obs9) = 110} (52)
S4 ::=
{GphB:Gly⇒ Evt⇒ R,RtV:Str⇒ Gly⇒ Evt⇒ R, . . .} (53)
A4 ::=
{∀e:Evt, s:Str, g:Gly. RdV(s,g,e) = c×RedShift(s,g,e), (54)




GphB(Glxy71,Rad(s,Glxy71)) = RtV(s,Glxy71,Obs9), (56)
c = 299792458, (57)
RedShift(Star1,Glxy71,Obs1) = 300, (58)
RedShift(Star9,Glxy71,Obs9) = 300} (59)
Sig(BO3 ′ ,O4 ′ ) ::= {S3∪S4∪S3,4} (60)
Ax(BO3 ′ ,O4 ′) ::=
{∀e:Evt, s:Str, g:Gly. RtV(s,g,e) = OV(g,Rad(s,g),e) (61)
Fig. 5: Initial model of the Dark Matter case study. Ontolo-
gies O3′ and O4′ are in essence two sub-ontologies of O3
and O4, respectively. O3′ contains only the axioms (48 - 50)
and O4′ contains all the axioms of O4. BO3 ′,O4 ′ combines the
signatures of O3′ and O4′, which are the same as those of
O3 and O4, and aligns RtV with OV . This allows the contra-
diction with O4 to become explicit to match the WMS trig-
ger formula (16). Note how the galaxy, its velocities and the
graphs representing it are all modelled as higher order pred-
icates in equations (48, 49, 54, 55, 56).
is the curve that has a positive gradient between zero and
some point and a zero gradient thereafter. Such knowledge
makes it possible to compare the predictions and the obser-
vations. O3 introduces the galaxy rotation curve GphA in
its signature, S3, a Keplerian curve computed according to
equation (48) (which models equation (42)) where Evt, Gly,
Dst, and Str denote types for representing events, galaxies,
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distances, and stars, resp.; G denotes the universal gravita-
tional constant; OV , the orbital velocity; gr, the set of stars
in the galaxy g up to distance r; Mass, the mass of a body.
O4 introduces GphB in its signature, S4, the curve based on
observations, computed according to equations (54) to (56)
(which model equations (43) to (45)) where RtV denotes the
rotational velocity; RdV , the radial velocity; SyV , the veloc-
ity of the galactic system relative to the observer; Inc, the
inclination of the galaxy; RedShift, the shift in wave length;
Glxy71, the galaxy being observed; Star1 to Star9, stars in
the observed galaxy; and, Obs9, the observation event.
Some symbols in O4, such as RtV and RdV , are not in
the language of O3. BO3 ′,O4 ′ links together the seemingly
disparate terms by relating RtV in O4 to the OV in O3. This
allows the contradiction with O4 to become explicit to match
the WMS trigger formula (16):
O3′′ ` GphA = UpFlat (62)
BO3 ′,O4 ′ ⊕O4′ ` GphA < UpFlat (63)
where O3′′ is a sub-ontology in the factorised representa-
tion of O3 containing all of the original axioms such that the
above holds. Given the substitution:
{O3′′/Ox,BO3 ′,O4 ′ ⊕O4′/Oy,
GphA/ f ,Glxy71/stuff ,UpFlat/v}
WMS repairs the two ontologies as in ν(Ox) (i.e. by re-
naming in O3′ all occurrences of Glxy71 to Glxy71vis) and
as in ν(Oy) (i.e. by adding to O4′′ the distinction between
visible and invisible Glxy71).
Ax(ν(O3′′)) ::= {φ{Glxy71/Glxy71vis}|φ ∈ Ax(O3′′)} (64)
Ax(ν(O4′)) ::= {Glxy71invis ::= Glxy71−Glxy71vis}
∪ Ax(O4′) (65)
The effect of the repair is not limited to ν(O3′′) and ν(O4′)
but can be propagated to the entire corresponding represen-
tation. Every sub-ontology in each representation receives
the same treatment of repair, i.e.
∀O ∈ F (O3).
Ax(ν(O)) ::= {φ{Glxy71/Glxy71vis}|φ ∈ Ax(O)}
∀O ∈ F (O4).
Ax(ν(O)) ::= {Glxy71invis ::= Glxy71−Glxy71vis}∪
Ax(O).
5 The Inconstancy ORP
The Inconstancy ORP, described in Figure 6, is triggered
when, given an ontology Ox representing the current state
of a physical theory and some ontologies Oy.i representing
Trigger: Ox is the predictive ontology, Oy.i(v(bi) =τ′ vi) ∀i ∈ [1,n] are
the observational ones, made under the conditions v(bi) =τ′ vi. If
f (stuff ) is measured to take different values in at least two of these
observational ontologies, then an unexpected variation is detected.
The inference of the conflict w.r.t the observational data can be
aided by ontologies Oz.i. We can formalise the trigger formulae as
follows:
∃Ox,Oy.1, . . . ,Oy.n,Oz.1, . . . ,Oz.n:O,
τ,τ′,τ′′,τ′′′:Types,stuff :τ, f :τ⇒ τ′,c,c1, . . . ,cn:τ′,
v1, . . . ,vn:τ′′′,b1, . . . ,bn:τ′′,v:τ′′⇒ τ′′′
(Ox ` f (stuff ) =τ′ c∧ (66)
Oy.1(v(b1) =τ′′′ v1)⊕Oz.1 ` f (stuff ) =τ′ c1∧
...
...
Oy.n(v(bn) =τ′′′ vn)⊕Oz.n ` f (stuff ) =τ′ cn∧ (67)
∃i, j ≤ n. Ox ` ci 6=τ′ c j ∨ ci 6=τ′ c) (68)
ontology;
Repair: The repair is to change the signature of all the ontologies to
relate the inconstancy, stuff , to the variad, v(y) via a new function
F the value of which can be determined by regression analysis
against the data from the sensory ontologies:
ν(stuff ) ::= λy. F(c,v(y)) (69)
The signatures of the new ontologies are updated in terms of those
of the old as follows:
Sig(ν(Ox)) ::= {F :τ′⇒ τ′′′⇒ τ′,ν(stuff ):τ′′⇒ τ} ∪
Sig(Ox)\{stuff :τ} (70)
Sig(ν(Oy.i(v(bi) =τ′′′ vi))) ::= {ν(stuff ):τ′′⇒ τ} ∪
Sig(Oy.i(v(bi) =τ′′′ vi))\{stuff :τ} (71)
Sig(ν(Oz.i)) ::= {ν(stuff ):τ′′⇒ τ} ∪
Sig(Oz.i)\{stuff :τ} (72)
The axioms of the new ontologies are calculated in terms of those
of the old, where Ax(O) returns all axioms of O, as follows:
Ax(ν(Ox)) ::=
{φ{stuff/ν(stuff )(y)} |φ ∈ Ax(Ox)}\{stuff ::= c}∪
{ν(stuff ) ::= λy. F(c,v(y))} (73)
Ax(ν(Oy.i(v(bi) =τ′′′ vi))) ::=
{φ{stuff/ν(stuff )(bi)} |φ ∈ Ax(Oy.i(v(bi) =τ′′′ vi))} (74)
Ax(ν(Oz.i)) ::=
{φ{stuff/ν(stuff )(y)} |φ ∈ Ax(Oz.i)} (75)
where, each of the instantiations of the Oy.is does not share on-
tologies if it is a combination of several ontologies; and, if the
instantiation of Oz.i is a combination of ontologies and some of
these make up the instantiation of Ox, then those ontologies do not
receive the repair specified in (75).
Fig. 6: The Inconstancy ORP.
sensory information arising from experiments, the sensory
ontologies give distinct values for function stuff in differ-
ent circumstances. Suppose function v(bi) of the ith sensory
ontology, where vector bi contains variables distinguishing
among these circumstances, returns distinct values in each
of these circumstances, but is not one of the parameters in
stuff , which does not depend on v(bi). We call stuff the in-
constancy and v(bi) the variad. The Inconstancy repair plan
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establishes a relationship F between the variad and the in-
constancy.
To discover the meaning of the function F , Inconstancy
follows the tradition of Langley’s BACON program (Langley
et al., 1983). The ontologies Oy.i(v(bi) =τ′′′ vi . . .) provide
a useful collection of equations: F(c,v(bi)) =τ′ ci for i =
1, . . . ,n. Regression analysis can be applied to these equa-
tions to approximate a definition of F . This hypothesis can
then be tested by creating observations Oy.k(v(bk)=τ′′′ vk . . .),
for new values of v(bk), and confirming or refuting the hy-
pothesis. If the inference relies on the use of a bridging on-
tology between a sensory and a theoretical ontology, then all
occurrences of the inconstancy in the bridge are replaced by
the new term with a free variable as its argument.
5.1 Inconstancy application to the MOND approach
The MOdified Newtonian Dynamics (MOND), proposed by
Milgrom in 1981, is alternative to dark matter and exam-
plifies how the same observations can trigger a different re-
pair plan, Inconstancy. MOND suggests that the constant G
is not a constant, but depends on the relative acceleration
between the objects on which it acts. It is constant until
the acceleration becomes very small and then it depends on
this acceleration. So, the gravitational constant G (the in-
constancy) in equation (42) can be repaired by redefining
it as a function of itself and of the centripetal acceleration
of stars due to the gravitational attraction between the star
and the galaxy in which it belongs (the variad). Figure 7 ex-
tends and modifies the axiomatisation presented in Figure
56.. S5,6 extends S3,4 to include the symbol for centripetal
acceleration Accel(s,e). This is defined in O5 as a function
F of orbital velocity and in O6 as a function of rotational
velocity. O6.1 and O6.9 contain the data that allow to calcu-
late according to equation (55) the rotational velocity for
Star1 to Star9, which has the same value. Therefore, ac-
cording to equation (80) their acceleration varies with their
radius. The bridges BO6.1 ′,O5 ′ and BO6.9 ′,O5 ′ , which are the
same as BO3 ′,O4 ′ , equate orbital and rotational velocity, al-
lowing to calculate the local value for G, which varies as
the variad. O5′ is a sub-ontology, containing the minimal
number of axioms of O5 for the contradiction with O5 to
become explicit by matching Inconstancy’s trigger formu-
lae (66) through (68), where G is calculated in each O6.i′
combined with O5′ via the bridge BO6.i ′,O5 ′ by the inverse
of equation (48) (the value of which is equated here to Gi,
for the sake of brevity, in the substitutions that follow). Note
6 Note that in the implementation of GALILEO there are two in-
dependent theories for the Dark Matter and the MOND case studies.
For the sake of simplicity, the Isabelle theory for MOND was stripped
down to the minimal structure needed to run and test the ORP rather
than prove that the two theories derive from the same core.
S5,6 ::= S3,4∪{Accel:Obj⇒ Evt⇒ R . . .} (76)
S5 ::= S3 (77)
A5 ::=
{(48),(49,(50),(51),(52)}∪




S6 ::= S4 (79)
A6 ::=
{(54),(55),(56)}∪




c = 299792458} (81)
A6.1 ::=
{RedShift(Star1,Glxy71,Obs1) = 300 (82)
Rad(Star1,Glxy71) = 2} (83)
...
A6.9 ::=
{RedShift(Star9,Glxy71,Obs9) = 300 (84)
Rad(Star9,Glxy71) = 18} (85)
Sig(BO6.1 ′ ,O5 ′ ) ::= S
′
6.1∪S5 ′ (86)
Ax(BO6.1 ′ ,O5 ′ ) ::= {(61)} (87)
Sig(BO6.9 ′ ,O5 ′ ) ::= S
′
6.9∪S5 ′ (88)
Ax(BO6.9 ′ ,O5 ′ ) ::= {(61)} (89)
Fig. 7: Initial model of the MOND case study. Ontologies
O5′ is a sub-ontology of O5 with only axioms (48), (49),
(50), and (78). Bridges BO6.1 ′,O5 ′ and BO6.9 ′,O5 ′ , like BO3 ′,O4 ′
in Figure 5, equate orbital and rotational velocity and al-
low to calculate the local value for G, which varies as the
variad, i.e., the centripetal acceleration of a star (i.e., the rate
of change of a star’s tangential velocity around the galaxy).
This allows the contradiction with O5 to become explicit.
also that O5′′ is the sub-ontology in the factorized represen-
tation of O5 that contains all axioms of O5:
O5′′ ` G ::= 6.673×10−11 (90)
O6.1′(Accel(Star1,Obs1) = A1)⊕BO6.1 ′,O5 ′
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...
...
O6.9′(Accel(Star9,Obs9) = A2)⊕BO6.9 ′,O5 ′




O5′′ ` Gi 6= G j for 1≤ i < j ≤ 9 (93)
Given the substitutions:
∀i ∈ [1,n]
{O5′′/Ox,O6.i′/Oyi ,BO′6.i,O5 ′ ⊕O6
′⊕O5′/Oz.i,
G/stuff ,λx.x/ f ,6.673×10−11/c,Gi/ci,
Accel/v,〈Stari,Observationi〉/bi,Ai/vi}
where O6′ is a sub-ontology in the factorised representation
of O6 containing all of the original axioms. Inconstancy re-
pairs the ten ontologies by redefining the inconstancy G as
a function of G and of the variad Accel and by replacing the
old definition with the new one:
Ax(ν(O5′′)) ::= {φ{G/ν(G)(〈s〉)} |φ ∈ Ax(O5)}
\{G ::= 6.673×10−11}∪
{ν(G) ::= λ〈s〉. F(G,Accel(〈s〉)} (94)
Ax(ν(O6.i′(Accel(〈Stari,Observationi〉) = Ai))) ::=
{φ{G/ν(G)(〈Stari〉)} |φ ∈
Ax(O6.i′(Accel(〈Stari,Observationi〉) = Ai))} (95)
Ax(ν(BO6.i ′,O5 ′)⊕O6′) ::= {φ{G/ν(G)(〈s〉)} |
φ ∈ Ax(BO6.i ′,O5 ′ ⊕O6′)} (96)
The effect of the repair is not limited to the sub-ontologies
indicated above, but it can be propagated to the entire cor-
responding representation. Every sub-ontology in the fac-
torised representation receives the same treatment of repair.
5.2 Inconstancy application to the speed of light
One of the earliest recorded discussions of the speed of light,
c, was by Aristotle, who believed that light travelled instan-
taneously and rejected theories about finite speeds of light.
In 1676, a Danish astronomer, Ole Roemer, measured c by
studying Io, one of Jupiter’s moons, which was known to
be eclipsed by Jupiter at regular intervals (Ellis and Uzan,
2005). Roemer discovered that the eclipses kept lagging be-
hind the predicted times, but then started to pick up again.
This discovery helped him come up with the theory that
when Jupiter and Earth were further apart, there was more
distance for light reflecting off Io to travel to Earth and there-
fore it took longer to reach his telescope. Figure 8 represents
S13,14 ::= {
Light:Obj,Jupiter:Planet . . .} (97)
S13 ::= {
TravTime:Obj⇒ Time, (98)






TravTime(Light) = 0} (101)
S14.1 ::= {
ArrTime:Obj⇒ Time, (102)
ObsVel:Obj⇒ Obj⇒ Obj⇒ R, . . .} (103)
A14.1 ::= { (104)
Pos(Jupiter,1) 6= Pos(Jupiter,5) (105)
Pos(Earth,1) = Pos(Earth,5) (106)
∀o1,o2,o3:Obj, t:Time.ObsVel(o1,o2,o3, t) =
Dst(Pos(o2, t),Pos(o3, t))
ArrTime(o1)− t , (107)
Dst(Pos(Earth,1),Pos(Jupiter,1)) = 1, (108)
ArrTime(Light) = 2} (109)
S14.2 ::= {(102),(103)} (110)
A14.2 ::= {
(105),(106),(107), (111)
Dst(Pos(Earth,5),Pos(Jupiter,5)) = 5, (112)
ArrTime(Light) = 7} (113)
Sig(BO13 ′ ,O14.1 ′ ) ::= S13∪S14.1 (114)
Ax(BO13 ′ ,O14.1 ′ ) ::= {TravVel = ObsVel} (115)
Sig(BO13 ′ ,O14.2 ′ ) ::= S13∪S14.2 (116)
Ax(BO13 ′ ,O14.2 ′ ) ::= {TravVel = ObsVel} (117)
Fig. 8: Initial model of the Light case study. Ontologies O13′,
O14.1′ and O14.2′ are sub-ontologies of O13, O14.1, and O14.2,
respectively. O13′ contains only the axiom (100), O14.1′ con-
tains all the axioms of O14.1, and O14.2′ contains all the ax-
ioms of O14.2. Bridges BO13 ′,O14.1 ′ and BO13 ′,O14.2 ′ allow to
calculate the local value for travel time TravelTime, which
varies as the variad. This allows the contradiction with O13
to become explicit.
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the state of the theory of the speed of light at the time of Roe-
mer’s measurement. At the top S13,14 contains the shared
signature with type definitions, for instance, for Light and
Jupiter. O13 defines in equation (100) the velocity TravVel
of an object o1 from o2’s position to o3’s position as the ratio
between the distance between o2 and o3 and o1’s travel time,
TravTime. O13 also contains Aristotle’s postulate (101) ac-
cording to which light’s TravTime is zero (making the result
of equation (100) impossible). On the other hand, O14.1 and
O14.2 assume that Jupiter has different positions in times 1
and 5 and in equation (107) it defines the observed velocity
ObsVel of an object o1 travelling from o2’s to o3’s position
as the ratio between the distance from o2’s to o3’s position
at the particular time of o1’s departure and the difference
between o1’s time of arrival and its time of departure. O14.1
and O14.2 contain estimates for the distances between Earth
and Jupiter at times 1 respectively 5, as well as measure-
ments for light’s ArrTime. Finally, the bridges 7 BO13,O14.1
and BO13,O14.2 link together the seemingly disparate terms
by relating TravVel and ObsVel. This allows the contradic-
tion about the value of TravTime(Light) between O14.1 and
O14.2 to become explicit, as follows:
O13′′ ` TravTime(Light) = 0 (118)
O14.1′(Dst(Pos(Earth,1),Pos(Jupiter,1) = 1)⊕
BO13 ′,O14.1 ′ ⊕O13′ ` (119)
TravTime(Light) = 1 = TravTime(Light)1
O14.2′(Dst(Pos(Earth,5),Pos(Jupiter,5) = 5)⊕
BO13 ′,O14.2 ′ ⊕O13′ ` (120)
TravTime(Light) = 2 = TravTime(Light)9
O13′′ ` 1 6= 2 (121)
where O13′′ is a sub-ontology in the factorised representa-
tion of O13 containing all of the original axioms such that
the above holds. Given the substitutions




Inconstancy repairs the three ontologies by redefining the in-
constancy TravTime(Light) as a function of TravTime(Light)
and of the variad Dst and by replacing the old definition with
7 Note that in the implementation of GALILEO there are no bridges
for the Light case study. For the sake of simplicity, the Isabelle theory
was stripped down to the minimal structure (i.e., the same signature







{ν(TravTime(Light)) ::= λ〈pm, pn〉.
F(TravTime(Light),Dst(〈pm, pn〉)} (122)
Ax(ν(O14.1′











Ax(ν(BO13 ′,O14.i ′ ⊕O13′)) ::=
{φ{TravTime(Light)/
ν(TravTime(Light))(〈pm, pn〉)} |
φ ∈ Ax(BO13 ′,O14.i ′ ⊕O13′)} (125)
The effect of the repair is not limited to the sub-ontologies
indicated above, but it can be propagated to the entire cor-
responding representation. Every sub-ontology in the fac-
torised representation receives the same treatment of repair.
6 The Unite ORP
The Unite ORP, described in Figure 9, is triggered when the
observed values of the defining properties of two distinct
f (stuff )s are the same8. Just like WMS, Unite assumes two
ontologies: an ontology Ox representing a predictive Physics
theory and labelling a given property as defining and another
ontology Oy representing some sensory information arising
from observations. In case of a heterogeneous representa-
tion, a bridging ontology may be involved in the reasoning.
Contrary to WMS, Unite is not triggered by a contradiction,
but by an equality of two f (stuff )s (a redundancy) relative
8 For instance, the orbits of (heavenly) bodies is one of their defin-
ing properties, i.e., equating two orbits is equivalent to identifying the
corresponding bodies as the same one, according to the principle that
two objects cannot be at the same place at the same time.
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Trigger: Ox is the predictive ontology and Oy is the observational one.
If f (stuff 1) and f (stuff 2) cannot be proven to have the same nor
different values in Ox and in Oy but the value of f (stuff 1) and
f (stuff 2) for meta-level property dp, labelled as defining in the
meta-level ontology OM , is the same, then the following formula
will be triggered:
∃Ox,Oy:O, τ,τ′,τ′′:Types, dp:τ⇒ τ′′, stuff 1,stuff 2:τ
f :τ⇒ τ′.
(Ox 0 f (stuff 1) =τ′ f (stuff 2) (126)
Ox 0 f (stuff 1) 6=τ′ f (stuff 2) (127)
OM ` DefProp(dp,τ′) (128)
Oy ` dp(stuff 1) =τ′′ dp(stuff 2) (129)
where DefProp(dp,τ′) means that the function dp is a defining
property for objects of type τ′.
Repair: Since the two f (stuff )s have the same value for its defining
property of objects of their type, they are identified as one.
f (stuff 1) =τ f (stuff 2) (130)
Let ν(Ox) be the repaired predictive ontology. The axioms for the
new ontologies are updated in terms of those of the old, where
Ax(O) returns all axioms of O, as follows:
Ax(ν(Ox)) ::= { f (stuff 1) =τ′ f (stuff 2)} ∪ Ax(Ox) (131)
To effect the repair, the axioms of ν(Ox) are the same as those of
Ox except for the addition of the new definition.
Fig. 9: The Unite ORP
to the chosen defining property. The repair is to equate in Ox
stuff 1 and stuff 2.
6.1 Unite application to the Morning and Evening Star
Because Venus is closer to the Sun than the Earth, it becomes
visible either just before dawn or just after sunset, when it
is the brightest heavenly object after the Moon. These two
kinds of appearance were not originally identified as coming
from the same object. It was only with the quantification of
astronomy that the 4-dimensional orbits9 of these two stars
were calculated and seen to be the same (up to experimental
error).
One way of comparing the two orbits is to calculate their
mean anomaly M, i.e., the parameter relating position and






where a is the length of the orbit’s semi-major axis, M and m
are the orbiting masses, and G is the gravitational constant,
t is time.
For instance the mean anomaly of specific bodies orbit-
ing the Sun can be understood as the time since the last point
9 The 4-dimensional orbits covers the three dimensions of space and
time
of closest approach to the Sun (periapsis) multiplied by their
mean motion.
Figure 10 axiomatizes the case study at hand. S9,10 pro-
vides type declarations for the Morning Star, MS, the Evening
Star, ES, and the Sun, Sun, which are of the type of objects
Obj. O9 provides theoretical knowledge for calculating the
mean anomaly of objects orbiting the Sun and declares the
defining property. O9 asserts only definitions but no data,
because no prediction is made using the new heliocentric
theory in its own right. On the other hand, O10 contains no
definitions, as the old geocentric theory is not relevant, while
the observations of MS and ES in O10 are. The observations
of MS and ES are based on the angles of the visual range and
the distances from Earth. The bridging ontology10BO9,O10
relates together the observed angles of an object, the dis-
tance of the object from Earth and the radius of the object.
O9′ 0 MS = ES (151)
O9′ 0 MS 6= ES (152)
OM ` DefProp(MeanAnom,Obj) (153)
O9′⊕BO9 ′,O10 ′ ⊕O10′ ` ∀e.MeanAnom(MS,e) = (154)
MeanAnom(ES,e)
Given the substitutions:
{O9′/Ox,O9′⊕BO9 ′,O10 ′ ⊕O10′/Oy,MS/stuff 1, (155)
ES/stuff 2,MeanAnom/dp,λx.x/ f}
Unite repairs O9′ as follows:
Ax(ν(O9′)) ::= {MS =τ ES}∪Ax(O9′)
The effect of the repair is not limited to ν(O9′) but applies to
the entire corresponding representation. Every sub-ontology
in the representation receives the same treatment of repair.
6.2 Unite application to the shape of the Earth
Pythagoras was one of the first astronomers to realise that
the Earth was a sphere. He gathered evidence to support
this theory from various sources, among which were obser-
vations of lunar eclipses. He noticed that the edge of the
shadow that the Earth cast on the Moon was always circular.
He reasoned that the only 3D shape that always casts circu-
lar shadows is a sphere, which is also the shape of a ball.
The defining property for shapes of objects is
λx.ShapeofParam(Project(x,Flat)) (165)
which is essentially the shape of the projection of an object x
onto a flat surface. The idea is that if two 3D objects always
10 Note that in the implementation of GALILEO there are no bridges
for the Morning and Evening Star case study. For the sake of simplicity,
the Isabelle theory was stripped down to the minimal structure (i.e., the
same signature was used for both ontologies) to test the ORP.
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S9,10 ::=
{MS:Obj,ES:Obj,Sun:Obj . . .} (133)
S9 ::=
{MeanAnom:Obj⇒ Evt⇒ RSet, . . .} (134)
A9 ::=




AM ::= {DefProp(MeanAnom,Obj)} (136)
S10 ::= {} (137)
A10 ::=
{∀e:Evt.Mass(Sun,e) = 1.9891×1030, (138)
∀e:Evt.Mass(MS,e) = 4.868×5×1024, (139)
∀e:Evt.Mass(ES,e) = 4.868×5×1024, (140)
Angle(MS,Obs1) = 1.3×10−4, (141)
Angle(ES,Obs1) = 1.3×10−4, (142)
Angle(MS,Obs5) = 1.2×10−4, (143)
Angle(ES,Obs5) = 1.2×10−4} (144)
Dst(MS,Earth,Obs1) = 44.7×106, (145)
Dst(ES,Earth,Obs1) = 44.7×106, (146)
Dst(MS,Earth,Obs5) = 45.5×106, (147)
Dst(ES,Earth,Obs5) = 45.5×106} (148)
Sig(BO9 ′ ,O10 ′ ) ::= S9∪S10∪S9,10 (149)
Ax(BO9 ′ ,O10 ′ ) ::=
{∀o:Obj,e:Evt,v:R.
Rad(o,e) = Dst(o,Earth,e)× tan(1
2
Angle(o,e))} (150)
Fig. 10: Initial model of the Morning and Evening Star case
study. Ontologies O9′ and O10′ are two sub-ontologies of
O9 and O10, respectively. O9′ contains all the axioms of O9
and O10′ contains all the axioms of O10. The bridge BO9 ′,O10 ′
allows to calculate the radius of MS and ES from measure-
ments of the angle of visual range and their distances from
Earth. With BO9 ′,O10 ′ , the definitions and data available in
O9 and O10 can be used to identify that the two stars are one
heavenly body.
S11,12 ::=
{Shapeof :Obj⇒ Shape,Earth:Obj,Ball:Obj,Flat:Surface . . .} (156)
S11 ::=
{Project:Obj⇒ Surface⇒ (R⇒ R×R), (157)
ShapeofParam:(R⇒ R×R)⇒ Shape, . . .}
A11 ::= {
ShapeofParam(a,b) = circle←→∃k.a = (λm.k× cos(m)) ∧ (158)
b = (λm.k× sin(m))}
AM ::= {DefProp(λx.ShapeofParam(Project(x,Flat)),Shape)} (159)
S12 ::= {} (160)
A12 ::=
{Project(Earth,Flat) = λt.(2× cos(t),2× sin(t)), (161)
Project(Earth,Flat) = λt.(2∗1010 ∗ cos(t),2×1010× sin(t))} (162)
Sig(BO11 ′ ,O12 ′ ) ::= S11∪S12∪S11,12 (163)
Ax(BO11 ′ ,O12 ′ ) ::= {} (164)
Fig. 11: Initial model of the shape of the Earth case study.
Ontologies O11′ and O12′ are two sub-ontologies of O11 and
O12, respectively. O11′ contains all the axioms of O11 and
O12′ contains all the axioms of O12. O11′⊕BO11 ′,O12 ′ ⊕O12′
allows to calculate the shape of Earth and Ball from the def-
initions available in O11′ and the data available in O12′; thus,
we can identify the shapes of the two projections being the
same.
have the same 2D projections then they have the same shape
themselves. For the projection of the Earth onto a (almost)
flat surface, e.g., the surface of the Moon, the parameterisa-
tion of the shape of the projection is
λt.(2×1010× cos(t),2×1010× sin(t)) (166)
and for a ball onto a flat surface, the parameterisation is
λt.(2× cos(t),2× sin(t)) (167)
Thus, the parameterisations of the projections differ only in
scale. Multiple, independent projections are required in or-
der to draw an accurate conclusion. A cylinder also projects
as a circle along its axis, but most of its projections are not
circular, so one projection is not enough. Note also that the
observed projections of Ball are a thought experiment.
Figure 11 axiomatizes the case study at hand. S11,12 pro-
vides type declarations for, among others, the symbols Shapeof
and Earth. A11 provides part of the theoretical knowledge
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for orthographic projections. AM declares the defining prop-
erty for such knowledge. On the other hand, A12 contains
observations of lunar eclipses. Given O11′ and O12′ each be-
ing a sub-ontology of A11 and of A12, respectively, O11′⊕
BO11 ′,O12 ′ ⊕O12′ allows to apply the theory to the available
data as follows:
O11′ 0 Shapeof (Earth) = Shapeof (Ball) (168)
O11′ 0 Shapeof (Earth) 6= Shapeof (Ball) (169)
OM ` DefProp(λx.ShapeofParam(Project(x,Flat)), (170)
Shape),




{O11′/Ox,O11′⊕BO11 ′,O12 ′ ⊕O12′/Oy,Earth/stuff 1,
Ball/stuff 2,λx.ShapeofParam(Project(x,Flat))/dp,
Shapeof/ f}
Unite repairs O11′ as follows:
Ax(ν(O11′)) ::= {Shapeof (Earth) = Shapeof (Ball)} ∪
Ax(O11′)
The effect of the repair is not limited to ν(O11′) but to the
entire corresponding representation. Every sub-ontology in
the representation receives the same treatment of repair.
7 Implementation
GALILEO is prototyped in the higher-order theorem prover
Isabelle (Paulson, 1994). Ontologies and bridges are repre-
sented as Locales (Ballarin, 2004), i.e., as independent proof
contexts that can be extended. If a locale M is an extension
of a locale L, then all symbols in the signature of L are in
the signature of M and all theorems of L are theorems of
M, as expected. With the ability to create extensions, merg-
ing locales is naturally possible, as merging two locales can
be obtained by creating a new locale that extends from both
of them. For our application, extensions essentially allow to
modularise and express dependencies between the ontolo-
gies.
Just like the corresponding ORPs illustrated in Fig. 3, 6,
9, each of GALILEO’s procedures supports two main reason-
ing tasks: the diagnosis of the conflict between the consid-
ered ontologies and their repair.
7.1 Conflict diagnosis
The goal of conflict diagnosis is the correct instantiation of
the term stuff as well as of every existential variable in the
trigger. This is essentially a reasoning task, which is per-
formed by using Isabelle’s higher-order matching (HOM) al-
gorithm, a special case of higher-order unification (HOU). In
each ORP, conflict diagnosis consists of four main phases:
preparation, verification, term discovery, heuristics-based fil-
tering.
7.1.1 Preparation
In order to reduce the inferential search scope, the user pro-
vides the conflicting ontologies (e.g., O′1 and B⊕O′2) as
well as the shape of the contradiction, i.e., a sentence that
is provable in one of the ontologies but not in the other (e.g.,
Heat(H2O,Melting) = 0). Note that the ontologies indicated
here are expected to be sub-ontologies of the input, i.e. on-
tologies within the factorised representation. This prepara-
tion phase is made necessary by the fact that the instantia-
tion of existentially quantified higher order variables is not
tractable in the highly general setting we are working with.
Therefore the contradiction between two or more given on-
tologies must be made explicit. In practice, the higher order
theorem prover is provided with a theory file specifying the
ontologies as well as the proofs of the conflicting statements
that constitute the trigger of each ORP.
Note that the limitation on the instantiation of existen-
tially quantified higher order variables, imposes an addi-
tional information requirement in the case of Unite. As ex-
plained, to avoid looping, this ORP requires the instantiation
of stuff 1 and stuff 2 rather than the instantiation of f (stuff 1)
and f (stuff 2). Therefore during the preparation phase Unite
is provided with the instantiations of stuff 1 and stuff 2.
7.1.2 Verification
Before proceeding to the analysis of the terms that appear in
the contradictory statements, a verification procedure checks
that the contradictory statements indeed follow from the pro-
vided ontologies. Technically this is done by checking that
the contradictory statements can be discharged as proof obli-
gations in the search space specified in the theory file. This
phase is important for ensuring that the appropriate repair is
to be performed on the faulty ontologies.
7.1.3 Term discovery by higher-order matching
Since ORPs are intended to be highly general, GALILEO au-
tomatically determines the correct concrete type of the ex-
istential variables in the corresponding trigger formula, in-
cluding f , stuff , and v. For instance, in the Latent Heat case
study presented in Fig. 4, Heat(H2O,Melting)> 0 is a sen-
tence that is provable in one ontology (e.g. O1) but not in an-
other (O2). Here the exact instantiation of the variable stuff
is not immediately clear because stuff is polymorphic and
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variadic. The sentence Heat(H2O,Melting)> 0 is an object-
level formula, so the identification of the instantiations of
stuff must be a meta-level procedure. Using schematic-variables
(or meta-variables) ? f , ?stuff , ?v, and ?op, the following pat-
tern can be created:
?op(? f (?stuff ),?v) (171)
where ? f , ?stuff , and ?v respectively corresponds to f , stuff ,
and v in WMS’s presentation in Figure 3, and ?op corre-
sponds to the function used for comparing between f (stuff )
and v11. So, to obtain the instantiation for each existential
variable in the trigger formulae, the complete pattern for,
e.g., WMS, is in the following shape:
∃v1,v2. ?O=⇒?op1(? f (?stuff ),v1)∧ ?op2(v1,v2) . . . (172)
where ?O is expected to be instantiated to an ontology in
a relevant factorised representation, and op1 and op2 corre-
spond to partial orders. Here, ontologies are assumed to be
predicates, where each axiom is a conjunct. Patterns based
on (171) actually hit a highly difficult aspect of HOU, as
matching it against a sentence demands the creation of pos-
sible functions to solve a constraint involving a function
variable. Isabelle imposes a restriction on the automation
such that a meta-type variable ?α is not transformed into
one of some function type. Without this restriction, each
free variable can be unified to many more terms, yielding a
unification space too large for practical applications. How-
ever, since ?stuff is supposed to be variadic and polymor-
phic, assigning the type of ?stuff to ?α is too restrictive
for our application. For instance, if we match (171) with
?stuff :?α against the sentence Heat(H2O,Melting)> 0 us-
ing HOM, stuff ⇒Heat would not be a valid substitution, be-
cause Heat is a second-order function with an arity of two.
Our solution is to generate a collection of type patterns that
range over the potential arities and function order of stuff
and v. Each type pattern is then used for matching (171)
against the sentence, and therefore, stuff can be instantiated
to functions of different types with different arities. Simi-
larly, ?v can also be instantiated to functions of various ari-
ties. For instance, the Latent Heat case study requires ?v to
be instantiated to 0, which is of type R, whereas the Dark
Matter case study requires it to be instantiated to U pFlat,
which is a function of type R⇒ R.
Furthermore, as shown in Tables 2, 3, 4, the depth of the
unification is determined by a so-called unify search bound
(usb), which effectively acts as a limit on the logical order
of the matches returned by the system. For instance, in Table
2 for 3 ≤ usb ≤ 4 the system returns zeroth order matches
(i.e. propositional matches), for usb = 5 the system returns
first order matches, for usb = 6 the system returns second or-
der matches, etc. Note also that the distribution of matches
11 Note that partial orders can be expressed as binary functions.
across the various usb’s from top to bottom provides in-
sight into the system’s reasoning trace for what concerns at-
tempted generalizations. However, the relation between usb
and logical order is not absolute, it varies per case study, as
it depends on the term in question. Also note that, for the
same case study, the usb’s at which a given set of solutions
is found may vary with the version of GALILEO. That is be-
cause the usb also depends on the pattern being matched and
new patterns are added to new versions.
7.1.4 Heuristics-based filtering
Due to the high generality of the trigger formulae deter-
mined by f ’s and stuff ’s polymorphism, the space of possi-
ble instantiations typically contains a large number of matches.
These, though, often contain arbitrary λ-expressions that have
no meaningful physical relevance. A heuristics-based filter-
ing is used to automatically prune the solution space, e.g.,
disregarding instantiations that contain either:
– the identity function;
– no element of the signature;
– the same functional symbol applied to permuted argu-
ments;
– a λ-abstracted variable as dominant function.
7.2 Repair
Once a match is selected, the repair takes place. Recall that
the existentials representing the ontologies in conflict are in-
stantiated to some ontologies in a factorised representation
of the originals in order to trigger an ORP. However, the ef-
fect of repair is not limited to the instantiations but to the en-
tire corresponding representation. Every ontology in a rep-
resentation receives the same treatment of repair if deemed
relevant, e.g., if it contains occurrences of the instantiation
of stuff .
Occurrences of the instantiation of stuff in an axiom are
checked by HOM as well. Even though the transformation
rules of repair require only syntactic analysis of the axioms,
formalising repair as a HOM problem provides more robust-
ness to the whole procedure. Thus, the look-up of occur-
rences of stuff in a formula involves searching for a match.
8 Evaluation
As anticipated in Section 1, the empirical results provided
by the evolutions proposed by GALILEO allow to confirm
our hypothesis regarding the evaluation of various desirable
properties: coverage, efficiency, maintainability, high qual-
ity of the repairs. In particular, the results allow to conclude
that the generality of a Higher-Order Logical approach to
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ontology evolution is beneficial to the quality of the repairs,
in terms of the meaningfulness of the proposed evolutions.
8.1 Coverage and efficiency
The expressivity of a polymorphic Higher-Order Logic is
valuable in achieving generality. The instantiations of stuff ,
as well as of the other variables in the ORPs’s trigger for-
mulae, are diverse in types and arities, and allow to handle
disparate case studies.
On the other hand, exactly because of HOL’s expressiv-
ity, the initial number of matches returned by the theorem
prover before the heuristics are applied is extremely high.
When diagnosed at higher usbs (between 6 to 10), some
case studies can return millions of instantiations for stuff
and the other meta-variables. The heuristics successfully re-
ject the inappropriate matches and make the set of solutions
viable and correct, as the historically accurate solution is al-
ways present.
8.2 Maintainability
There are two aspects of GALILEO’s implementation that
pose maintainability issues. On the one hand, there is the
maintenance of the ORPs, i.e., of the HOM-based diagnostic
and repair machinery. Here the main problems are the re-
quired knowledge of Isabelle’s programming language, ML,
and the interaction between the ORPs and Isabelle. In or-
der to make this interaction as easy to maintain as possible
GALILEO is based on a modular architecture, where ORPs
are independent of one another.
On the other hand, there is the modeling effort required
for the case studies. Such modeling has proven to be a very
demanding and time-consuming task, which requires a set
of multidisciplinary skills ranging from an understanding of
the Physics involved in a given case study to the appreci-
ation of the historical state of the field at the time of the
case study, from an eye for the conceptual and logical anal-
ysis needed for formalizing the case studies, to the practical
ability at implementing knowledge and proofs in a theorem
prover such as Isabelle. As further explained in Section 9,
unfortunately we have not found any viable pre-existing for-
malisation of the required physical theories. Yet such a for-
malization would make implementing the case studies much
easier and, more importantly, would facilitate deeper infer-
ence to extend the range of ontology repairs.
8.3 Quality of the repairs
The multiplicity of matches returned by the ORPs can be
evaluated from two main perspectives:




5 λa.Heat(a, Melting):Obj⇒ R (3)
5 λa.Heat(H2O, a):Evt⇒ R (4)
6 λa b.Heat(a, b):Obj⇒ Evt⇒ R (5)
Table 2: Output of diagnosis for the Latent Heat case study
at progressively larger unify search bounds 0 ≤ usb ≤ 6.
Before usb= 3 , matches do not make it through the heuris-
tics. The historically preferred match is (5), which is reached
at usb= 6.
usb Match of stuff No.
5 λa.Glxy71 a:Obj⇒ bool (0)
5 λa.GphB (λa.Glxy71 a) a:R⇒ R (1)
Table 3: Output of diagnosis for the Dark Matter case study
at progressively larger unify search bounds 0 ≤ usb ≤ 5.
Before usb= 5 , matches do not make it through the heuris-
tics. The historically preferred match is (0), which is reached
at usb= 5.
usb Match of stuff No.
2 G:R (0)
Table 4: Output of diagnosis for the MOND case study, at
progressively larger unify search bounds 0 ≤ usb ≤ 2. Be-
fore usb = 2 , matches do not make it through the heuris-
tics. The preferred instantiation is (0), which is reached at
usb= 2.
1. Is the accurate historical match returned?
2. Do other matches correspond to physically interesting
ontology repairs?
In all cases provided to GALILEO, the historically pre-
ferred diagnoses are returned. These are (5) in Table 2, (0)
in Table 3, (0) in Table 4, (0) in Table 5. For what concerns
Unite, as explained, this ORP is provided with the instantia-
tions of stuff 1 and stuff 2, and this makes the search unnec-
essary; therefore no table of diagnoses is given for this ORP.
For the other ORPs, though, a number of alternate matches
make it through the heuristics. These matches can be clas-
sified, e.g., as experimental errors or as physically plausible
alternate matches.
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Table 5: Output of diagnosis for the Light case study, at pro-
gressively larger unify search bounds 0 ≤ usb ≤ 3. Before
usb= 0 , matches do not make it through the heuristics. The
preferred instantiation is (0), which is reached at usb = 2.
Note that matches reached at usb= 0 are printed after those
reached at a higher usb; this reflects how the automated the-
orem prover’s search strategy is modified by increasing the
usb, which allows it to explore more general solutions first.
Also the redundancy of matches (0) and (1) is only apparent,
as the instantiation of the other meta-variables (e.g. v or bi)
does vary in the two diagnoses.
Experimental errors are matches of the lowest logical order,
such as (0), (1), (2) in Table 2, (0) in Table 4 and (2) in
Table 5. Matches of this type do not seem to suggest
the need for new physical laws, but rather the need to
repeat the measurements because of experimental errors.
In the case of (0) in Table 4, the suggested revision has
a general value, in the sense that what is suggested is
the revision of the value of a physical constant such as
G, i.e., of a fundamental component of a Physics theory,
which, though, is subject to measurement.
Physically plausible alternate matches suggest viable repairs
leading to alternative physical laws. For instance, (3) and
(4) in Table 2 are two such cases. (4) suggests to repair
the heat function specific to water. As discussed in Sec
4.1 this solution was actually investigated by Black, and
led to the definition of the notion of specific heat (con-
stant c). (3), on the other hand, suggests a repair to the
heat function specific to melting. This solution too is vi-
able, and actually led to the study of calorimetry.
8.4 Degree of automation
Given the potentially vast number of ontologies generated
in a factorised representation, it is essential to automate the
factorisation of the input ontologies. GALILEO incorporates
the ability to take an ontology as input and generate the sub-
ontologies.
As outlined in Section 7.1, the execution of conflict diag-
nosis itself consists of three components: verification, which
is a procedure for checking if an ORP is indeed applica-
ble to the given ontologies; term discovery, which identifies
all valid instantiations of the variable stuff ; and, heuristics-
based filtering, which eliminates physically implausible hy-
potheses (potential repairs). In the implementation, only the
verification requires user interaction, because solving non-
trivial reasoning problems in Higher-Order Logic typically
requires manual guidance. Fortunately, GALILEO is imple-
mented on top of Isabelle, so the user has access to all the-
orem proving facilities available in Isabelle, including auto-
mated first-order provers, a range of tactics, and a rich li-
brary of theorems. Once verification is completed, the sys-
tem searches for all physically plausible potential repairs
and returns them to the user. Typically, more than one po-
tential repair remains after filtering and the user is required
to select the most appropriate repair with respect to their
specific intention. User interaction is required here as the
system has no knowledge about the user’s intention or de-
sire.
The repair process is entirely automated. The system
analyses the parameters of both the dependencies and the
morphisms between each ontology in the environment to de-
cide in which ontology the repair should be effected. In all,
the meta-level reasoning and operations are entirely auto-
mated, whereas some interactive guidance is required at the
object-level due to the intrinsic complexity underlying HOL
reasoning.
8.5 Comparison with DL approaches
Another possible element of evaluation of the approach is a
comparison with DL approaches. Compared to the approaches
found in the literature and discussed in Section 2, our ap-
proach expands the space of solutions. The application of an
Ontology Repair Plan often combines the retraction and/or
addition of axioms as well as the deeper modification of the
language in which the ontology is represented. Note that a
version of WMS specialized for DL would have to produce
repairs for subsumption axioms based onv and on unionsq, rather
than for equations based on ::= and on +, like equation
(17). If such a specialized version of WMS were applied to
the incoherent and inconsistent ontology network of univer-
sity and company members shown in Figure 2, an additional
class of solutions would be proposed, and one of these solu-
tions would look as follows:
– add to sig(T ∗∗uni ) both Employeevis and Employeeinvis;
– modify T ∗∗uni by adding to it the following axioms:
Employeevis v Employee (173)
Employeeinvis v Employee (174)
– rename in Map(T ∗∗uni ,Tcom) Employee to Employeevis.
To interpret this repair, consider that instances of Employee
in the repaired network may either be instances of Employeevis
or of Employeeinvis or of PhDStudent. The first ones are vis-
ible to Tcom because they are mapped to Staff in Tcom. In
other words, instances of Employeevis in a university, like
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staff members in a company, cannot be trainees. In the WMS-
repaired network the classification of bruce does not yield
a contradiction, nor does the classification of instances of
other concepts. Although not strictly needed, an additional
modification of WMS for DL may also repair the entailment
between PhDStudent and Employee, and make the former a
subconcept of Employeeinvis, i.e., university employees that,
unlike staff members in a company, can be trainees.
9 Further work
In this paper we have described case studies of the appli-
cation of three Ontology Repair Plans that evolve physical
theories that are either inconsistent with the experimental
evidence or are redundant. We have also evaluated our ORPs
on some additional case studies that we do not describe in
detail here. For instance, WMS has been tested on models
of the hypothesis of the existence of a planet called Vulcan,
which was meant to explain peculiarities of Mercury’s or-
bit (today explained by general relativity). Inconstancy has
been applied to models of the discovery of various laws of
fluids, for instance, Boyle’s law (in a closed system, the in-
versely proportional relationship between the pressure and
volume of a gas depends on temperature).
There are many further potential case studies that we
have not had the resources to implement. The New Scien-
tist magazine, for instance, is a prolific source of such po-
tential case studies, generating one or two candidates per
week. The majority of these are case studies for the WMS
ORP, with Inconstancy being the second most frequent ORP.
The reason we cannot implement all these case studies is
that formalising the area of Physics under-pinning them re-
quires a significant investment of time and effort. If there
were a pre-existing formalisation of all physical theories,
then implementing such case studies would be much simpler
and would facilitate deeper inference that would extend the
range of ontology repairs. Unfortunately, only a few small
fragments of the required formalisation currently exist. De-
veloping such an all encompassing formalisation, to include
not only all currently accepted theories but also those now
disproved, would be an immense undertaking, requiring re-
sources far beyond that available to our project.
We have designed and implemented additional ORPs that
are not mentioned in this article. These include the follow-
ing:
Reidealisation: Given two ontologies that disagree over the
value of some measurement, which is the kind of con-
flict WMS detects and repairs, one could resolve a spe-
cial case of this kind of conflict without inventing some
invisible component and taking the viewpoint that the
original conceptualisation gives only a partial view of
the underlying property. Instead, the idealisation of the
property could be changed such that it is viewed as be-
ing a property of another type. With the new idealisa-
tion, the measurement function, which originally returns
different values in each of the two ontologies, will no
longer return conflicting values.
Spectrum: A variation of Unite is to realise that a number of
apparently different objects are different manifestations
of the same phenomena. The classic example of this ORP
is the realisation that light, radio waves, X-rays, etc. are
all kinds of electro-magnetic waves that lie along a spec-
trum.
We have also designed other ORPs but have not had the
resources to implement or evaluate. These include the fol-
lowing:
Constancy: Just as Unite is a dual of WMS, Constancy is the
dual of Inconstancy. Instead of revealing that a function
has a hidden dependency, Constancy shows that a func-
tion is independent of an assumed dependency. Historic
examples of Constancy include Galileo Galilei’s demon-
stration that the acceleration of an object due to gravity
is independent of its mass and his observation that the
period of a pendulum is independent of its amplitude.
Unify: A more extreme version of Spectrum is to Unify two
or more ontologies by replacing them with a new on-
tology that subsumes them all. The current search for
a Grand Unified Theory to encompass both gravity and
quantum mechanics is an attempt to apply Unify. Clas-
sic applications of Unify were Maxwell’s unification of
electricity and magnetism and Glashow, Weinberg and
Salam’s unification of electromagnetic and weak forces.
Analogy: An under-appreciated role of analogy is the ini-
tial population of an ontology for a new phenomenon by
the recycling of an ontology for an already understood
phenomenon. The classic example of the Analogy ORP
is the initial population of an ontology for electricity by
analogy with the ontology for hydraulics. Other popular
applications of Analogy are the many attempts to adapt
evolutionary theory to explain economic and social situ-
ations.
We have developed our theory of ontology evolution in
the Physics domain largely because of the plentiful supply of
well documented case studies on which to evaluate it. How-
ever, as our discussions in Figure 1 and Section 8.5 illus-
trate, we intend our theory to be a general one that is ap-
plicable to other domains and adaptable to other logics. In
particular, we intend to continue our study of its application
to Description Logics and its ability to extend the range of
belief revisions to new kinds of plausible revisions. Further-
more, it would be interesting to conduct further experiments
to distinguish between the plausible repairs and allow the
heuristics to select the historically accurate solution.
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In this article we have presented a Higher-Order Logical ap-
proach to ontology evolution in the domain of Physics. As
argued in Section 2, the need for a higher order approach
to the evolution of formal representations of concepts and
their relationships (e.g., ontologies, knowledge bases, logi-
cal theories, etc.) arises from the inherent lack of generality
of existing DL and FOL approaches. In order to go beyond
axiom retraction and/or addition and achieve subtler forms
of automated diagnosis and repair, a meta-logic more ex-
pressive than DL or FOL is required. We have shown that,
especially because of the polymorphism of its symbols, HOL
can be such meta-logic. HOL’s formulae can abstract over
types, number of arguments, etc. thus expanding the logical
search space and providing elements for the formulation of
declarative theories of ontology evolution – as opposed to
the algorithms usually found in the DL- or FOL-based litera-
ture.
This higher-order approach under-pins a framework which
includes both a methodology for the formalization of ontol-
ogy evolution in HOL and an implementation of this method-
ology in the theorem prover Isabelle. The main elements of
the GALILEO framework are:
Ontologies formalised as (sub-)contexts by using locales, i.e.,
as multiple logical theories.
Bridges, i.e., contexts that are used to resolve possible lin-
guistic differences between ontologies that do not share
exactly the same language.
Conflicts between ontologies that are each locally consistent
or parsimonious but that globally contradict each other
or contain redundancies with respect to one another.
These conflicts are inspired by case studies in the his-
tory of Physics, in which clashes between theories, ex-
periments, observations, etc. resulted in the field’s evo-
lution.
Ontology Repair Plans, i.e., mechanisms for the diagnosis
of conflicts between locally consistent or parsimonious
but globally inconsistent or redundant ontologies as well
as for their evolution by means of axiom retraction and/or
addition and/or signature change.
The presentation, application and evaluation of three of
GALILEO’s Ontology Repair Plans has provided empirical
evidence of the value of a HOL-based approach to ontol-
ogy evolution. In Sections 4 through 6 the ORP Where’s
My Stuff? was applied to the discovery of latent heat and
to the postulation of dark matter; Inconstancy was applied
to Modified Newtonian Dynamics in the study of galaxies
and to the observations that proved the speed of light to be
finite; Unite was applied to the identification of the Morning
and Evening Stars and to the assessment of the shape of the
Earth. This formal apparatus set the stage for the discussion
and evaluation of the implementation in Sections 7 and 8.
The implementation is prototyped in the higher-order theo-
rem prover Isabelle, using Locales to represent ontologies
and higher-order deduction and matching with heuristics to
perform diagnosis and repair. The prototype has proven to
be a valuable tool for exploring the space of solutions. On
the one hand, the power of HOL and HOM is unleashed on the
case studies, and this results in a number of matches that is
often huge. On the other hand, the heuristics have proven ef-
fective in curbing this power, by bringing the solution space
to a manageable size, yet always returning the historical so-
lution alongside other physically meaningful ones.
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